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6Europe’s response to the so-called ‘migration crisis’ has 
been driven almost exclusively by a border control agenda. 
This has significantly reduced the number of refugees and 
migrants arriving in Greece, for the time being at least, 
but has done nothing to address the drivers or causes of 
migration to Europe, including the movement of people 
from Libya which continues unabated, or the protection 
and integration needs of those who are already here. 
Several years into the ‘crisis’, there is still no sign of 
a coherent long-term response. Both the reception 
infrastructure and the asylum system in Greece have 
failed to adapt to the needs of the refugees and 
migrants. This is partly a Greek failure but it is also a 
failure of the EU. Meanwhile escalating conflicts in 
Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan and Iraq continue to displace 
hundreds of thousands of people from their homes 
every day. The assault on Mosul (Iraq) which began in 
mid-October 2016 is expected to displace 1.5 million 
people, many of whom are likely to cross the border into 
Eastern Turkey just a few hours away. Understanding 
the dynamics of migration to Europe and why some of 
these people might decide to risk their lives crossing the 
Mediterranean remains a pressing concern.
The context
In 2015 an estimated 1,011,712 refugees and migrants 
crossed the Mediterranean to Europe in search of safety 
and a better life. Nearly 4,000 people are estimated to 
have died trying to make this journey. Migration across 
the Mediterranean dominated European political debate 
and media coverage during 2015. The focus was on the 
drama of the perilous journeys across the Mediterranean, 
the smugglers facilitating irregular crossings and the 
hardships endured by refugees and migrants during the 
journey and on arrival.
Taken together, these events were widely perceived as 
constituting a ‘crisis’: of uncontrolled and unregulated 
movement into Europe, of the political failure of States to 
respond collectively and of the international community 
to address the pressing humanitarian needs of those 
arriving on Europe’s shores. 
Politicians and policymakers across Europe have largely 
talked about the arrival of refugees and migrants in 
2015 as an unprecedented ‘event’, a single coherent 
flow of people that came ‘from nowhere’, suddenly and 
unexpectedly pressing against the continent’s southern 
border. This has been reflected in the tendency of the 
media and policymakers to focus almost exclusively on 
the beginning and the end of peoples’ journeys to the 
neglect of everything in-between. There has been little or 
no interest in the ‘back stories’ of those arriving; instead 
the gap between someone leaving their home country 
and his or her or arrival in Europe has been filled with 
generalisations and assumptions.
Our research
Since September 2015 a team of researchers led by the 
Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) 
at Coventry University, working in collaboration with 
University of Birmingham’s Institute for Research into 
Superdiversity and the Centre on Migration, Policy and 
Society at Oxford University in the UK and partners 
in Greece (ELIAMEP), Italy (FIERI), Turkey (Yasar 
University) and Malta (People for Change Foundation), 
has been undertaking research into the dynamics of 
migration at the borders of southern Europe. 
Funded by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) and Department for International Development 
(DfID) in the UK, the MEDMIG project aims to fill this 
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7gap by providing the first large-scale, systematic and 
comparative study of the backgrounds, experiences, 
routes and aspirations of refugees and migrants in three 
EU Member States – Italy, Greece and Malta – and Turkey. 
The research aims to:
•	 	Shed	light	on	the	dynamics	(determinants,	drivers	
and infrastructures) underpinning the recent 
unprecedented levels of migration across, and loss of 
life in, the Mediterranean;
•	 	Provide	insights	into	the	interaction	of	refugees	
and migrants with a multitude of non-State actors 
(for example smugglers, facilitators, and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and State actors 
(for example, the navy / coastguard) in order to better 
understand their decision making processes; and
•	 	Explore	how	the	decisions	made	by	refugees	 
and migrants on their journeys interact with 
dramatically changing global economic, security  
and political contexts. 
The fieldwork on which the analysis in this report is 
based took place between September 2015 and January 
2016 when arrivals of women, men and children into the 
EU via southern Europe reached their peak. During this 
time we interviewed 500 refugees and migrants travelling 
via the Central (Libya to Italy and Malta) and the Eastern 
(Turkey to Greece) Mediterranean routes and more than 
100 stakeholders. 
The report unpacks the journeys and routes to Europe of 
the people who took part in this research and provides a 
framework for understanding the diverse array of strategies 
that individuals pursue in an attempt to secure safety and 
a livelihood for themselves and their families. It examines 
the factors that shaped the decision of our respondents 
to leave their home countries and, in the case of those 
who spent extended periods of time in a number of other 
countries, continue their journeys onwards towards Europe. 
And it explores the relationship between respondents and 
the smugglers who facilitated their journeys.
Unpacking migration to Europe
The representation of the movement of refugees and 
migrants as linear, singular uninterrupted journeys 
or flows of people heading toward Europe is grossly 
misleading. The focus on the points of departure and the 
sea crossings is equally misleading. These simplifications 
distract from what were often multiple separate 
movements which converged in Libya and Turkey helping 
to explain the arrival of refugees and migrants in Italy and 
Greece respectively.
The average duration of migration for those arriving 
in Greece via the Eastern Mediterranean route was 
considerably shorter than for those arriving via the 
Central Mediterranean route to Italy or Malta. The time 
between leaving the country of origin and arriving in 
Europe was shortest for Syrians and Iraqis and longest 
for Afghans and Eritreans.
Our findings challenge the idea that all those arriving 
in Europe have crossed all the borders on their 
journey irregularly (without authorisation and/or the 
necessary documentation). There are significant 
differences between groups depending on their access 
to documents and other resources which results in a 
mixture of regular and irregular crossings. 
Many respondents witnessed death and/or experienced 
violence during their migration. Experiences of violence 
and death were not limited to the sea crossing but could 
8be found along the entire route. More than three quarters 
(76%) of respondents who were interviewed in Italy and 
Malta said that they had directly experienced physical 
violence and nearly a third (29%) had witnessed fellow 
travellers dying. The majority of these episodes occurred 
in Algeria, Niger and Libya. 
The decision to leave – and move on
Conflict in the countries neighbouring Europe was a 
major factor contributing to the significant increase in 
the number of refugees and migrants arriving in 2015, 
both as a cause of primary and secondary movement. 
More than three quarters (77%) of respondents explicitly 
mentioned factors that could be described as ‘forced 
migration’. The figure was even higher at 91% for 
those interviewed in Greece reflecting the significant 
proportion of Syrians in our sample. 
Although the situation is more complicated for the 
Central Mediterranean route, nearly two thirds (66%) 
of those who were interviewed in Italy and Malta made 
reference to factors associated with ‘forced migration’ 
when describing the reasons they decided to leave their 
home country. Many more had experienced conflict, 
persecution and human rights abuses in the countries to 
which they subsequently moved, most notably Libya.
More than a quarter (28%) of respondents interviewed in 
Greece told us that the activities of Islamic State (IS) had 
been an important factor in the decision to leave, particularly 
in Syria but also in Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. 
Respondents from Syria and Iraq described kidnapping 
by State and non-State agencies (including a range of 
militia groups) as a significant factor in their decision 
to leave their countries of origin. Those who had spent 
time in Libya also described the risk of kidnapping as a 
significant factor in the decision to move on. 
 
For Eritreans, Syrians and Afghans living in Iran, the risk / 
fear of forced indefinite conscription into the government 
army, militia or rebel force was a major factor underlying 
the decision to leave. 
There is often a complex and overlapping relationship 
between ‘forced’ and ‘economic’ drivers of migration  
to Europe. Many of those who left their home countries 
primarily due to economic reasons effectively became 
refugees and were forced to move due to the situation 
in Libya and elsewhere. 
Others who decided to leave their homes due to conflict 
subsequently decided to move on again because they 
were unable to make a living or access healthcare and 
education. A third of respondents interviewed in Greece 
had moved on for what might typically be understood as 
economic reasons. 
There were significant differences between those 
interviewed in Greece and Italy as to whether they 
intended to stay in the first European country in which 
they had arrived. Virtually none of those who were 
interviewed in Greece intended to stay compared to 
more than two thirds (68%) of those interviewed in Italy. 
The role of smugglers
All of our respondents engaged the services of a 
smuggler for at least one leg of their journey to Greece 
Executive Summary
9or Italy. This was primarily because they were unable to 
access a safe and legal route to safety and/or protection. 
One in ten of our interviewees who entered Europe via 
the Eastern Mediterranean route had tried but failed 
to identify an alternative way to migrate legally, for 
example by applying for a visa for work or study, a UN 
resettlement programme or family reunification.
Smugglers performed two main functions for our 
respondents: they helped them to escape danger, 
conflict or persecution at home or en route and they 
enabled them to bypass controlled borders where  
these were a barrier to reaching safety, protection  
and/or livelihoods.
Contrary to the dominant representation of smugglers 
by politicians and the media as being part of vast 
criminal networks, our research found that smugglers 
were embedded in migrant social networks and local 
communities en route and were easy to find. By far the 
majority of interviewees across both the Central and the 
Eastern routes found their smugglers through friends, 
family members and extended social networks, either at 
home or along the way. According to our respondents, 
State officials, the military, law enforcement and border 
guards were also involved in smuggling. 
Many of our respondents experienced violence and 
threats from smugglers (along both routes), but it is 
important to acknowledge that violence also came from 
other actors (e.g. State officials, militias, military and 
the police). We also found some examples of human 
trafficking along the Central Mediterranean route, in 
particular concerning women from Nigeria and many 
examples of forced labour intermingled with smugglers. 
Respondents were often not clear however of the 
boundaries between the various actors and their  
different roles. 
Implications for EU migration policy
The humanitarian crisis that unfolded on the borders of 
the European Union – and is now increasingly unfolding 
inside – was not the result of a natural or unforeseen 
disaster. The arrival of large numbers of refugees and 
migrants was neither new nor unexpected. Rather the 
‘crisis’ was, in large part, policy driven and sustained 
by the failure of the EU to put in place adequate and 
humane responses to deal with this unprecedented but 
also foreseeable movement of people.
The failure of EU policies to respond effectively to the 
increased movement of people across the Mediterranean 
in 2015 was partly a reflection of political differences 
and tensions within and between EU Member States 
but also reflected flawed assumptions about the reasons 
why people move, the factors that shape their longer-
term migration trajectories and their journeys to Europe. 
These assumptions became deeply politicised over the 
course of 2015.
Due to the enormous diversity of geographies, people, 
drivers and motives a broad brush approach to migration 
across the Mediterranean will be insufficient. There is a 
need for nuanced, tailored and targeted policy responses 
which reflect the diverse, stratified and increasingly 
protracted and fragmented movements of people.  
Our report concludes with a discussion of five key 
challenges for policymakers.
10
Policy makers need to address both the primary 
and secondary drivers of migration to Europe. 
Although there is growing awareness within the EU 
of the need to pay attention to the drivers of forced 
migration, including the need for co-ordination in the 
fields of foreign policy, development and trade, the focus 
at the EU level has instead been on tackling irregular 
migration through improved co-ordination of border 
controls in order to contain the movement of people 
within countries and regions of origin. The focus needs 
to shift towards improving access to rights and socio-
economic security in the countries hosting significantly 
larger number of refugees and migrants than Europe.
There is a complex relationship between forced 
and economic drivers of migration to Europe. 
EU governments are legally obligated to treat all of those 
who arrive in accordance with international law, including 
with regard to the right to seek asylum. In practice this 
means providing access to protection for refugees and 
migrants arriving in Europe through irregular channels. It 
also means recognising that people’s reasons for leaving 
their counties of origin and travelling to Europe are 
complex and cannot be determined by nationality alone. 
EU politicians and policy makers have repeatedly 
declared they are ‘at war’ with the smugglers and that 
they intend to ‘break the smugglers business model’. 
The evidence from our research suggests that 
smuggling is driven, rather than broken, by EU 
policy. The closure of borders seems likely to have 
significantly increased the demand for, and use of, 
smugglers who have become the only option for those 
unable to leave their countries or enter countries in which 
protection might potentially be available to them. 
At the same time the number of people drowning in 
their attempt to cross the Mediterranean has increased 
Executive Summary
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significantly. At the time of writing, the total number of 
people recorded as dead or missing is higher than the 
total for 2015. Since the beginning of 2016 the number 
of people dying has increased to 1 in 46 people among 
those crossing via the Central Mediterranean route 
and to 1 death in every 407 arrivals via the Eastern 
Mediterranean route. In other words the death rate for 
the short distance from Turkey to Greece has more 
than doubled.
There is an urgent need to significantly expand 
safe and legal routes for protection. This includes 
significantly expanding current resettlement programmes, 
increasing humanitarian visas or establishing temporary 
international protection for those with a prima facie case 
for refugee status and increasing the scale of family 
reunification. 
The EU has focused almost exclusively on policies 
designed to contain refugees and migrants in countries 
and regions of origin at the expense of addressing 
the reception and protection needs of those arriving 
from situations of conflict, persecution and human 
rights abuse. There has also been a failure at the 
national and EU levels to address the longer-
term integration needs of refugees and migrants 
arriving in Europe.
During the course of 2015 the EU has intensified 
pressure on other countries to stem the flow and assume 
responsibility for refugee and migrants from neighbouring 
countries so they do not travel onward to Europe. There 
is a risk that efforts to stem the flow of migration to the 
EU exacerbate the conflict, violence and human rights 
abuse that leads people to leave in the first place. 
Policymakers need to engage with the issue of 
development as an important policy objective in 
its own right rather than primarily as a mechanism 
for preventing migration to Europe. And they need 
to be aware that the politics of containment – reflected 
in interdiction, interception and off-shore processing – 
have ‘ripple effects’ with developed countries taking a 
lead from the example of Europe and, in turn, reducing 
the protection they provide. As a result the European 
response to the so-called ‘migration crisis’ not only 
undermines access to protection for those arriving 
at Europe’s shores but threatens the principle of 
international protection at a global level. 
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 We don’t know who is to blame for what is
 happening in Syria but the Syrian people 
pay the price. We had our jobs, we had our 
businesses. Then one day we lost everything.  
We can find no peace in Syria. I was afraid that the 
regime will force my sons to join the army.” 
(Syrian woman aged 47 travelling with her 21 year old son)
In 2015 an estimated 1,011,712 refugees and migrants 
crossed the Mediterranean1 to Europe in search of 
safety and a better life. Nearly 4,000 are thought 
to have died trying to make this journey2. Migration 
across the Mediterranean dominated European 
political debate and media coverage during 2015. 
The focus was largely on the drama of the perilous 
journeys across the Mediterranean, the smugglers 
facilitating irregular crossings, the hardships endured 
by refugees and migrants during the journey and on 
arrival, and the political, economic, social and cultural 
implications of increased migration for EU Member 
States. Taken together, these events were widely 
perceived as constituting a ‘crisis’: of uncontrolled and 
unregulated movement into Europe, of the political 
failure of States to respond collectively and of the 
international community to address the pressing 
humanitarian needs of those arriving on Europe’s shores.
But the view from Europe tells us only a small part of  
a much bigger story.
The number of international migrants – those living in a 
country other than the one they were born in – reached 
244 million in 20153. According to the UN, this number 
has increased 41% since 2000. Although many of these 
people have chosen to move for work, to study or to 
be with their families, conflict, persecution and human 
rights abuse has also forced more people to leave their 
homes than ever before. By the end of 2015 more than 
65 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide, 
a quarter of whom (21.3 million) were refugees living 
outside their countries of origin4. Importantly, given 
the focus of this report, the scale of displacement 
accelerated during the course of 2015 with an estimated 
12.4 million people newly displaced due to conflict 
or persecution during the course of the year. Whilst 
the majority (8.6 million) stayed within the borders of 
their own countries, the remainder left in search of 
protection and an opportunity to rebuild their lives.
Some countries have been particularly affected by forced 
migration. The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic 
(Syria) began in March 2011 but escalated during the 
course of 2014 and 2015. By early 2016, there were 
reports of 470,000 deaths as a result of the conflict. 
More than 11% of the country’s population has been 
killed or injured5. Nearly half of the country’s population 
of around 23 million people has been displaced6. 
Although the conflict in Syria has been the focus of 
political and public attention because of the large 
refugee flows and humanitarian needs with which it 
Section 1
The view from Europe
1 We use the term ‘refugees and migrants’ throughout this report to reflect the nature of ‘mixed flows’ across the Mediterranean.
2  See IOM (2016) Mixed Migration: Flows in the Mediterranean and Beyond: Compilation of Available Data and Information 2015 available at https://www.iom.int/
sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/Mixed-Flows-Mediterranean-and-Beyond-Compilation-Overview-2015.pdf and data collected by IOM’s Missing Migrants Project 
available at missingmigrants.iom.int
3  UN (2015) ‘Trends in international migration’, Population Facts 2015/4, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/populationfacts/
docs/MigrationPopFacts20154.pdf
4  UNHCR (2016) Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015, Geneva: UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html 
5  This figure is from a report published by the Syrian Centre for Policy Research www.scpr-syria.org which was widely reported by the international press,  
see for example http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-staggering-new-death-toll-for-syrias-war-470000/ 
6  In 2011, the Syrian population was estimated at roughly 23 million permanent inhabitants, including people with refugee status from Palestine and Iraq and the 
indigenous Levantine people. Today the population is estimated to be around 12 million people.
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has come to be associated, many other conflicts also 
contributed to the increase in forced migration during 
2015. These included new or reignited conflicts in 
Burundi, Iraq, Libya, Niger, and Nigeria, together with 
older or unresolved crises in Afghanistan, the Central 
African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
South Sudan, Somalia and Yemen and ongoing political 
persecution in countries such as Eritrea and Gambia7.
It is important to acknowledge that the number 
of refugees and migrants who arrive in Europe is 
a tiny fraction of those on the move globally. Far 
larger movements of people occur in regions other 
than Europe. For instance, in 2015, almost 9 in 10 
international migrants living in Africa originated from 
another country in the same region, and over 8 in 10 in 
Asia8. And the vast majority of the world’s refugees, a 
massive 86%, live in low- and middle-income countries. 
These countries include Turkey, which for the second 
year running hosted the largest number of refugees 
(an estimated 2.5 million), Pakistan (1.6m), Lebanon 
(1.1m), Iran (979,400), Ethiopia (736,100) and Jordan 
(664,100)9. In the particular case of the nearly 5 million 
Syrians of concern to UNHCR, most have fled to – 
and remain in – the neighbouring countries of Jordan 
(0.75m), Lebanon (1.1m), and Turkey (2.7m)10.
7 UNHCR (2016) fn.4
8 UN (2015) fn.3 
9 UNHCR (2016) fn.4
10  See http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php About 2.8 million refugees are registered in Turkey (2.7 million from Syria), between a quarter and a third of whom 
crossed the Mediterranean in 2015.  Figures available at Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management (2016) Statistics. Ankara: DGMM,  
http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/migration-statistics_915_1024  It should be noted however that many Syrians are not registered and neither are registered Syrians 
deregistered once they have left. As a result these figures are widely considered unreliable. Moreover as seen from the information presented here, there are differences 
in the number of Syrians and other refugees reported to be registered Turkey even within the various documents produced by UNHCR.
© Heaven Crawley
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Unravelling the Mediterranean 
‘migration crisis’
Politicians and policymakers across Europe have largely 
talked about the arrival of refugees and migrants in 
2015 as an unprecedented ‘event’, a single coherent 
flow of people that came ‘from nowhere’, suddenly 
and unexpectedly pressing against the continent’s 
southern border. Media coverage of the ‘crisis’ gave 
the impression of a linear, uninterrupted flow of people 
heading towards Europe, most commonly represented 
by straight arrows on a map linking two distinct areas11. 
This was reflected in the tendency to focus almost 
exclusively on the beginning and the end of peoples’ 
journeys to the neglect of everything in-between. There 
has been little or no interest in the ‘back stories’ of those 
arriving: instead the gap between someone leaving 
their home country and his or her or arrival in Europe 
has been filled with generalisations and assumptions.
Whilst the large scale movement of refugees and 
migrants in Europe is relatively unprecedented since 
the end of World War Two12, it is not entirely unknown. 
In the early 1990s more than 2.3 million people fled 
from towns and villages in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) after it began to disintegrate in 199113. 
Germany received almost as many asylum applications 
from people fleeing conflict in the FRY in 1991/2 as 
it did during 2015. And while Greece’s role in playing 
host to significant numbers of refugees and migrants 
is relatively new in recent times, that of Italy is not. 
In reality, increasing numbers of refugees and migrants 
have been arriving across the Mediterranean since 
201114. This increase has been associated primarily 
with the Central Mediterranean route from North Africa 
to Italy and Malta (Figure 1). Between 1997 and 
2010 an average of 23,000 refugees and migrants 
were intercepted travelling to Italy by boat per year: 
in 2011 this rose to 63,000 and in 2014 reached 
170,00015. The number of people arriving by boat to 
Italy actually decreased in 2015 to just over 153,800 
and, at the time of writing, is roughly in line with last 
year. In Malta average arrivals of just under 1,600 have 
been recorded over the past decade, peaking in 2008 
(2,775) and 2013 (2,008) although recently arrivals 
have declined sharply to 568 in 2014 and 104 in 2015. 
As was explained in our earlier Research Brief, the 
dynamics behind these increased arrivals are closely 
intertwined with the medium to long-term evolution of 
international migration patterns to and from the Maghreb, 
particularly Libya, and associated with increased 
political instability in the region from 2011 onwards 
and the descent into chaos and conflict from 201416. 
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11  This point is also made by Mainwaring, C. and Brigden, N. (2016) ‘Beyond the border: clandestine migration journeys’, Geopolitics 21(2), 243-262. See, for example, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35486655 in the UK and http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/world/europe/a-mass-migration-crisis-and-it-may-yet-get-
worse.html?_r=0 in the US. Many more examples can be found through a simple google search of ‘migration to Europe’. 
12  The end of World War Two brought in its wake the largest population movements in European history. Millions of Germans fled or were expelled from Eastern Europe. 
Hundreds of thousands of Jews, survivors of the genocide perpetrated by the Nazis, sought secure homes beyond their native lands. And other refugees from every 
country in Eastern Europe rushed to escape from the newly installed Communist regimes. See Douglas, R.M. (2015) ‘Europe’s refugee crisis: the last time around it  
was much, much worse’, The Conversation https://theconversation.com/europes-refugee-crisis-the-last-time-round-it-was-much-much-worse-47621 
13  See http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/24/world/yugoslav-refugee-crisis-europe-s-worst-since-40-s.html 
14  UNHCR (2015) The Sea Route to Europe: The Mediterranean Passage in the Age of Refugees, Geneva: UNHCR, http://www.unhcr-northerneurope.org/uploads/
tx_news/2015-JUL-The-Sea-Route-to-Europe.pdf 
15  Although this increase happened in a significantly different context in terms of sea bordering practices and search and rescue at sea, with a much enhanced presence 
and control of the routes.
16  See McMahon, S. and Sigona, N. (2016) Boat Migration Across the Central Mediterranean: Drivers, Experiences and Responses, MEDMIG Research Brief 3, http://
www.medmig.info/research-brief-03-boat-migration-across-the-central-mediterranean/ 
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The significant change that took place in 2015 was in 
relation to the Eastern Mediterranean route from Turkey 
to Greece. Whilst most people crossed to Europe via 
the Central Mediterranean from Libya to Italy in 2014, 
the vast majority (84%) of those arriving by boat in 
2015 crossed the Aegean from departure points dotted 
along the Turkish coast18. In the last five months of 
2015 the story of Europe’s ‘migration crisis’ – which 
had been dominated by the stories of hundreds of 
people drowning in the Mediterranean between Libya 
and Italy earlier in the year – came to be dominated 
instead by images of thousands of people arriving every 
day on the beaches of the Greek islands19. In August 
2015 more than 100,000 people arrived in Greece, 
a significant increase on the 54,000 that had arrived 
the previous month. In the month of October, that 
figure doubled again to more than 200,000 people20. 
The majority of people arrived on the small island of 
Lesvos (population = 86,000), with smaller numbers of 
people arriving on Kos, Chios and Samos (Figure 2). 
17  Italian data is available at http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean. Maltese data is available at http://www.unhcr.org.mt/charts/category/12 
18  IOM (2016) fn.2 
19  Human Rights Watch (2016) European Union: Events of 2015, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/european-union-0   
20  UNHCR (2016) Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response – Mediterranean, composition of monthly Mediterranean Sea arrivals to Greece,  
http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83   
Figure 1: Arrivals across the Central Mediterranean route to Italy and Malta, 2005-2015 
(Source: Data from UNHCR, Italian Interior Ministry and Maltese Immigration Police17)
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It is clear from the data on the countries of origin 
of those arriving in Europe during 2015 that the 
increase in people crossing the Mediterranean from 
Turkey to Greece can be explained, in large part, by 
reference to the conflicts in Syria and elsewhere. Of 
those arriving in Greece in 2015, 90% came from 
just three countries: over half (56.1%) were of Syrian 
nationality (or of Palestinian origin living in Syria), 
followed by Afghans travelling either from Afghanistan 
or Iran (24.3%), and Iraqis (10.3%). The remainder 
was composed of relatively small numbers coming 
from a significant number of countries (74 in total). 
By contrast the refugees and migrants arriving in 
Italy were not dominated by any one single group: 
around a quarter of all arrivals were Eritrean (25.5%), 
followed by Nigerians (14.5%), Somalis (8.1%), 
Sudanese (5.8%), Gambians (5.8%), Syrians (3.8%), 
Malians (3.8%) and Bangladeshis (3.3%) with the 
remainder originating from 51 different countries21.
But the story is more complicated than can be 
explained by numbers alone. Indeed the almost 
exclusive focus on the scale of migration, which 
dominated political and policy debate the course of 
2015, has been at the expense of a more nuanced 
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Figure 2: Arrivals to Greece across the Eastern Mediterranean Route, Jan-Dec 2015
(Source: Data from IOM and UNHCR, 2016)
21  IOM (2016), fn. 2
22  For example, the EU’s refugee relocation scheme is only open to asylum applicants for which the average recognition rate of international protection at the EU level 
is above 75%. Currently just three nationalities have such high recognition rates: Syrians, Eritreans and Iraqis. See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/
policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_eu_solidarity_a_refugee_relocation_system_en.pdf
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understanding of the, sometimes vast, differences in 
the journeys of refugees and migrants, many of which 
were both fragmented and protracted. The description 
of some countries as ‘refugee producing’, and by 
implication others not, conceals the complex lived 
experiences of people from different backgrounds 
(nationality, religion, gender, class, age) living in the 
same country. During the course of 2015 it became 
increasingly apparent that policy and practice towards 
refugees and migrants arriving in Europe was being 
shaped by nationality rather than an assessment 
of individual circumstances as required under the 
1951 Refugee Convention. This was reflected in the 
introduction of policies that gave preferential treatment 
for those from some countries, most notably Syria, 
but negatively affected those arriving in Italy who 
were perceived by politicians and policy makers as 
coming from countries unaffected by conflict22. The 
focus on numbers also glosses over the experiences 
and decisions of people in the different places that 
they live in or pass through on their journey to Europe 
as well as the relationships between people and 
places and how these change over time and space. 
Social networks, access to digital technologies and 
different ways of exchanging information influence 
the decisions that refugees and migrants make along 
the way. Understanding the role of these factors is 
critical to developing a more nuanced appreciation 
of dynamics of increased migration to Europe. 
Our contribution to the 
evidence base
There have been a large number of reports published 
over the past year by international organisations 
and NGOs seeking to document developments 
in the Mediterranean region, both in terms of the 
experiences of those arriving and in relation to the 
policy response23. There has also been a growing 
number of first-hand accounts of the ‘crisis’ from 
journalists and others, many of whom have followed 
the journeys of refugees and migrants as they 
cross into Europe. While these accounts make 
an important contribution to the evidence base 
they are often based on existing statistical and 
other research evidence or on first-hand accounts 
involving a relatively small number of people24.
Existing academic research on migration dynamics 
in the Mediterranean region is also uneven in 
quality and scope and rarely based on systematic 
comparative data across countries of origin or arrival 
or between types of migration or migrant groups. 
Whilst the history, root causes, political and socio-
economic determinants in specific origin and transit 
countries are relatively well studied, there remain 
significant gaps in understanding, most notably in 
terms of socio-economic profile and differences in the 
motivations, aspirations and journeys of refugees and 
migrants. As with the political and policy debate, much 
23  See, for example, Amnesty International (2016) Trapped in Greece: An Avoidable Refuge Crisis, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur25/3778/2016/en/; 
Human Rights Watch (2015) The Mediterranean Migration Crisis: Why People Flee, What Europe Should Do; https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/19/mediterranean-
migration-crisis/why-people-flee-what-eu-should-do; MSF (2015) Obstacle Course to Europe: A Policy-Made Humanitarian Crisis at EU Borders, http://www.msf.
org/sites/msf.org/files/msf_obstacle_course_to_europe_0.pdf; Migration Policy Institute (2015) Before the Boat: Understanding the Migrant Journey http://www.
migrationpolicy.org/research/boat-understanding-migrant-journey; UNHCR (2015) The Sea Route to Europe: The Mediterranean Passage in the Age of Refugees http://
www.unhcr-northerneurope.org/uploads/tx_news/2015-JUL-The-Sea-Route-to-Europe.pdf; ODI (2016) Europe’s Refugees and Migrants: Hidden Flows, Tightened 
Borders and Spiralling Costs, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10870.pdf 
24  See, for example, Bauer, W. (2016) Crossing the Sea: With Syrians on the Exodus to Europe, High Wycombe: And Other Stories; Kingsley, P. (2016) The New 
Odyssey: The Story of Europe’s Refugee Crisis, London: Guardian Books; McDonald-Gibson, C. (2016) Cast Away: Stories of Survival from Europe’s Refugee Crisis,  
London: Portabello Books.
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of the academic literature on migration to Europe has 
focused on the drivers of migration or on what happens 
to refugees and migrants when they reach countries 
of destination25. Notable exceptions include a growing 
literature on migrant journeys26 and on the experiences of 
refugees and migrants in so-called ‘transit’ countries27. 
Meanwhile the categories that frame and shape both 
academic and policy research can serve to limit, rather 
than illuminate, our understanding of these complex and 
increasingly dynamic migratory processes. Research 
on ‘the migrant experience’ is all too frequently driven 
by, and tied to, abstract migrant categories created by 
law and policy to contain, and make sense, of migration 
flows. These categories impose significant limitations 
on our theoretical and conceptual understanding of 
the dynamics of migration and of the complex and 
multifaceted backgrounds, lives and identities of 
those who move, most notably by limiting studies 
to particular groups of migrants (‘irregular migrants’, 
‘economic migrants’, ‘refugees’) or those arriving 
from specific countries or with particular socially 
constructed identities (‘women’, ‘children’, ‘victims of 
trafficking’). This approach is problematic given what 
we know about the increasingly complex and shifting 
dynamics of migration in the Mediterranean region.
In this context the MEDMIG project provides 
the first large-scale, systematic and comparative 
study of the backgrounds, experiences, routes 
and aspirations of refugees and migrants in 
three EU Member States – Italy, Greece and 
Malta – and Turkey. The research aims to:
•	 	Shed	light	on	the	dynamics	(determinants,	
drivers and infrastructures) underpinning the 
recent unprecedented levels of migration across, 
and loss of life in, the Mediterranean;
•	 	Provide	insights	into	the	interaction	of	refugees	and	
migrants with a multitude of non-State actors (for 
example smugglers, facilitators, NGOs) and State 
actors (for example navy / coastguard) in order to 
better understand decision making processes; and
•	 	Explore	how	the	decisions	made	by	refugees	
and migrants on their journeys interact with 
dramatically changing global economic, 
security and political contexts. 
The fieldwork on which the analysis in this report is 
based took place between September 2015 and January 
2016 when arrivals of women, men and children into 
the EU via southern Europe reached their peak. During 
this time we interviewed 500 refugees and migrants 
travelling via the Central and Eastern Mediterranean 
routes: 205 in Italy (Sicily, Apulia, Rome, Piedmont, 
Bologna) and 20 in Malta (Central Mediterranean route); 
215 in Greece (Athens, Lesvos) and 60 in Turkey (Izmir, 
Istanbul) (Eastern Mediterranean route) (Annex 1). Within 
these countries the researchers employed a purposive 
sampling strategy to ensure that the backgrounds and 
demographic characteristics of respondents were 
broadly reflective of wider trends (Annex 2). We also 
interviewed more than 100 stakeholders, including 
politicians, policy makers, naval officers and coastguards, 
representatives of international and national NGOs, 
as well as volunteers to gain broader insights into the 
experiences and journeys of the refugees and migrants 
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25  See, for example, Thorburn, J. (1996) ‘Root cause approaches to forced migration: part of a comprehensive strategy? A European perspective’, Journal of Refugee 
Studies 9 (2), 119-35; Castles, S., Loughna, S. and Crawley, H. (2003) States of Conflict: The Causes of Forced Migration to the EU, London: IPPR; Neumayer, E. 
(2006) ‘Bogus refugees? The determinants of asylum migration to Europe’, International Studies Quarterly 49 (3), 389-410
26  See, for example, Collyer, M. (2010) ‘Stranded migrants and the fragmented journey’, Journal of Refugee Studies 23(3), 273-93, http://jrs.oxfordjournals.org/
content/23/3/273.full; Mainwaring, C. and Brigden, N. (2016) ‘Beyond the border: clandestine migration journeys’, Geopolitics 21(2), 243-262
27 See, for example, Collyer, M., Düvell, F. and de Haas, H. (2012) ‘Critical approaches to transit migration’, Population, Space and Place 18(4), 407-14
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with whom they come into contact. And we observed 
‘the crisis’ as it unfolded, including political and policy 
responses at the local, national and international levels. 
This report draws upon these interviews together 
with our observations from the field and a desk-based 
review of the existing literature. During the lifetime of 
the project members of the research team were also 
engaged in numerous national and international events 
(academic and practitioner seminars, public events, policy 
discussions, parliamentary inquiries and media debates) 
which provided an opportunity to ‘test out’ some of our 
findings and ideas and to better understand the broader 
context within which our research was situated28.
Structure of the report 
In Section 2 we unpack the journeys and routes to 
Europe of the 500 people who took part in this research 
and provide a framework for understanding the diverse 
array of strategies that individuals pursue in an attempt 
to secure safety and a livelihood for themselves and 
their families. This evidence suggests that migration 
to Europe is more complex and fragmented than is 
typically assumed and includes not only the journey 
to Europe itself but also much longer-term trajectories 
and serial migration decisions involving stops and 
stays of varying duration. These are frequently 
punctuated by experiences of violence and death.
In Section 3 we turn our attention to the factors that 
shaped the decision of our respondents to leave their 
home countries and, in the case of those who spent 
extended periods of time in a number of other countries, 
to continue their journeys onwards towards Europe. This 
is important in part to give voice to the diverse stories of 
individuals and families who ended up risking their lives 
to cross the Mediterranean but also because EU policy 
has been underpinned by a number of assumptions 
about the drivers and motivations of those on the move.
In Section 4 we explore our respondents’ use of, and 
relationship with, the smugglers who facilitated their 
journeys. Although smugglers are generally regarded 
as criminals who exploit the vulnerabilities of refugees 
and migrants, they have become an essential part of 
the story due to visa policies and other restrictions 
which make it virtually impossible for people to access 
safe and legal routes in order to secure protection. Like 
most other aspects of the story of Europe’s ‘migration 
crisis’ the relationship between smugglers and those on 
the move is more complex than typically presented.
We conclude this report in Section 5 with an assessment 
of the EU policy response. This response has, to date, 
been largely ineffective and has contributed, in turn, 
to the perception of migration in Europe as a ‘crisis’. 
Understanding the dynamics of migration across the 
Mediterranean and the fears, needs and aspirations of 
those who move provides new insights which can inform 
the development of more effective policy responses. This 
section outlines the implications for policy of the empirical 
evidence presented in the report. Our intended audiences 
include: policymakers and officials from EU governments, 
policymakers and officials from the European Commission 
and Council of Europe, officials from UN bodies, in 
particular UNHCR, and international organisations 
and NGOs working with refugees and migrants. 
28 Details of these events can be found on our project website www.medmig.info
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As noted in the introduction to this report, political and 
media coverage of the ‘migration crisis’ in 2015 gave 
the impression of a linear, uninterrupted flow of people 
heading towards Europe. The findings of our research 
suggest that rather than constituting linear routes 
and homogeneous flows, migration to Europe via the 
Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes should be 
seen primarily as a product of the merging of multiple 
flows which converged in certain locations, particularly 
Libya and Turkey. Each of these flows was, in turn, 
composed of people with different characteristics for 
whom the migratory experience took a distinct form.
In this section we describe the routes taken by the 
men and women that we interviewed prior to their 
arrival in Europe. We begin by outlining the diversity 
of routes, before unpacking the different types of 
movement that we found. These include not only the 
journey to Europe itself but longer term trajectories 
and serial migration decisions which involved stops 
and stays of varying duration. We conclude by 
looking at the experiences of refugees and migrants 
as they navigated these routes, focusing in particular 
on the negotiation of borders and experiences of 
violence, exploitation and death along the way.
Section 2
Not one movement but many:
unpacking migration to Europe
Key points
The representation of the movements of refugees and migrants as linear, singular uninterrupted 
journeys or flows of people heading toward Europe is grossly misleading. The focus on the points 
of departure and the sea crossings is equally misleading. These simplifications distract from what were 
often multiple separate movements which converged in Libya and Turkey and help to explain the arrival of 
refugees and migrants in Italy and Greece respectively.
The average duration of migration for those arriving in Greece via the Eastern Mediterranean 
route was considerably shorter than for those arriving via the Central Mediterranean route to Italy or Malta. 
The time between leaving the country of origin and arriving in Europe was shortest for Syrians and Iraqis and 
longest for Afghans and Eritreans.
Our findings challenge the idea that all those arriving in Europe have crossed all the borders on 
their journey irregularly (without authorisation and/or the necessary documentation). There are significant 
differences between groups depending on their access to documents and other resources which results in a 
mixture of regular and irregular crossings. 
Many respondents witnessed death and/or experienced violence during their migration. 
Experiences of violence and death are not limited to the sea crossing but can be found along the entire route. 
More than three quarters (76%) of respondents who were interviewed in Italy and Malta said that they had 
directly experienced physical violence and nearly a third (29%) had witnessed fellow travellers dying. The 
majority of these episodes occurred in Algeria, Niger and Libya. 
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Regions and routes
Migration flows across the Mediterranean are often 
broadly categorised into two key routes. One traverses 
the Eastern Mediterranean, from Turkey to Greece; 
the other crosses the Central Mediterranean from 
North Africa to Italy and Malta. Our research highlights 
significant differences, as well as some remarkable 
similarities, between these two routes. In this section 
we will describe the geography and duration of 
migration on each, before analysing the ways in 
which the journeys of our respondents developed.
It should be noted before we begin that there was 
huge diversity in the journeys made by the men and 
women we interviewed for this research, the countries 
they travelled through and the time spent there, as 
well as the mix of regular and irregular movement in 
each. Refugees and migrants who had crossed the 
Mediterranean had travelled along multiple and varying 
routes prior to their arrival in Europe, mostly making 
use of the same infrastructure (dirt tracks, roads, 
buses, ferries, planes) available to other travellers. 
They had travelled through a wide range of countries 
prior to their arrival in Europe, stretching across 
diverse areas of the world and, in some extreme 
cases, taking in countries in Southern Africa, the 
Americas and East Asia. Although there were two 
main countries from which refugees and migrants 
departed towards Europe, namely Turkey and Libya, the 
‘back story’ to this migration was actually composed 
of an intricate network of varied routes crossing the 
different regions from which refugees and migrants 
had originated. This network can be clearly in relation 
to the journeys of 122 of our respondents in Figure 3.
© Heaven Crawley
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Overall, the refugees and migrants that we interviewed 
had passed through a total of 57 different countries. 
On the Eastern Mediterranean route, they had travelled 
through a total of 21 different countries prior to reaching 
Greece, comprising a total of 26 geographical routes. 
On the Central Mediterranean route there was even 
greater variation, with refugees and migrants having 
crossed 36 different countries before reaching Italy 
or Malta and describing a total of 68 different routes 
through them. Furthermore, the Central and Eastern 
Mediterranean routes were not entirely separate and 
distinct: 20 respondents who were interviewed in 
Italy and Malta arrived into Europe via Turkey and 
Greece but then decided to travel onwards.
Altogether, our respondents had made more than 3,000 
stops, equating to an average of six stops per person 
between their country of origin and the location of our 
interview with them in Italy, Malta or Greece. Among 
the locations of these stops, we identified a number of 
‘hubs’ in which access to goods and services, including 
those needed for settlement or onward travel, were 
accessed by respondents. These included Tehran and 
Urmia (Iran), Van, Istanbul, Izmir (Turkey), Lesbos and 
Athens (Greece), Kassala and Khartoum (Sudan), 
Bamako (Mali), Niamey and Agadez (Niger), Sabha, 
Tripoli, Zuwarah (Libya), and Rome (Italy). Others had 
also stopped elsewhere within Europe, either during 
periods of previous settlement in places such as 
Section 2  Not one movement but many: unpacking migration to Europe
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Figure 3: Refugee and migrant routes to Europe (n=122)
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France or Germany or when travelling through Greece, 
Italy or the Balkans to reach other destinations. 
And yet, despite the extremely diverse patterns and 
routes traversed by our respondents, their migration 
ultimately converged at the Mediterranean to form more 
or less discernible flows to Europe via the Eastern and 
Central routes. In order to understand the scale of these 
movements, let us take a closer look at this convergence on 
the way towards the Mediterranean and southern Europe.
The Eastern Mediterranean route
All of the refugees and migrants that we interviewed in 
Greece had travelled through, and thus departed from, 
Turkey. However, prior to the Mediterranean crossing 
distinct routes to Turkey were found, each composed 
of various legs. People coming from countries which 
bordered Turkey (Syria, Iraq and Iran) generally undertook 
journeys which were in the main straightforward: women, 
men and family groups crossed land borders into Turkey, 
often from Syria to towns such as Kilis and Gaziantep. 
These borders remained open at the time of our research. 
From Iran, people mostly travelled clandestinely towards 
the border, crossed the more dangerous mountain border 
on foot to arrive in the Van region of Turkey. From Kilis, 
Gaziantep and Van they would travel onwards to the coast 
via Ankara, Istanbul and Antakya. In contrast, journeys 
from further afield in the Middle East or Africa could involve 
air, land or ferry travel according to the resources and 
opportunities available to the person making the journey. 
In summary, we were able to identify three principal 
routes which converged in Turkey and thus contributed 
to the significant increase in arrivals to Greece during  
the course of 2015: 
•	 	A neighbourhood route, from Syria and Iraq 
into Turkey and then from the southern border 
region via Istanbul, Ankara, or Mersin and Adana 
towards Izmir and from there to the Greek islands. 
•	 	A Middle Eastern29 regional route, from 
Afghanistan and sometimes Pakistan and through Iran 
into Eastern Turkey (Van) or from Lebanon overland 
or by ferry to Southern Turkey (Antakya, Mersin) and 
via Ankara and/or Istanbul to the Aegean coast. 
•	 	A Middle Eastern and North African (mostly 
MENA) route from Sudan, Egypt, Somalia, Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia or the Gulf countries (UAE, 
Oman) into Turkey, continuing on as above.
The Central Mediterranean route
The vast majority (96%) of our interviewees in Italy who 
had crossed to Europe via the Central Mediterranean 
route took a boat from Libya. However, their journeys 
to reach Libya originated in a wide range of different 
locations and were extremely varied. Respondents 
originating in the countries of West Africa30, often 
set out originally to local and regional destinations 
in buses, cars and lorries on journeys organised 
at short notice by travel agencies, friends or family 
members. As noted in our previous Research Brief, in 
many cases this could enable people to quickly get 
away from situations of violence or personal danger. 
In East Africa31, initial migration also often involved 
moving to a local destination such as the refugee 
camps in Sudan or the city of Khartoum. In the case 
of Eritrea, where snipers are reportedly ordered 
to shoot those seeking to leave the country, this 
could involve crossing dangerous borders on foot. 
Subsequent onward migration would see people move 
on to Libya, or to a lesser degree, Egypt or Algeria. 
29 We use the term ‘Middle East’ here in the broadest sense to delineate the social geographies created by the people on the move.
30  Respondents on this route came from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
31 Respondents on this route came from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan.
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In total we identified four principal routes which converged 
in Libya and fed into the Central Mediterranean crossing:
•	 	A North African route originating in 
Morocco, Tunisia, Libya or Egypt.
•	 	A West African route originating in countries 
of West and Central Africa, made up of highly 
fragmented and often lengthy trajectories with 
multiple stops along the way, converging in Burkina 
Faso, Mali and then Niger on the way to Libya;
•	 	An East African route originating in the Horn 
of Africa, made up of fragmented and long 
trajectories with various stops, often first in towns 
or refugee camps in Ethiopia or Sudan, and then 
for most on to the Sudanese capital Khartoum. 
From there, if they were unable to travel by air to 
Turkey or other global locations, people would 
set out to cross Libya or Egypt overland;
•	 	Routes from the rest of the world show patterns 
of migration that did not easily fit into the types 
outlined above, originating in countries beyond Africa 
such as Syria (air travel to Egypt, overland to Libya), 
Pakistan and Bangladesh (air travel to Libya). These 
routes also converged with the others in Libya.
The convergence of these different routes to form the 
Eastern and Central Mediterranean routes into Europe 
via Turkey and Libya can be clearly see in Figure 4.
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Duration of migration
We also found variation in the duration of migration 
from the point at which people left their home country 
or the country in which they were living to the point at 
which they arrived in Europe. Whereas some reached 
Europe in a matter of days, others had departed from 
their country of origin years before arriving at the place 
of our interview. We identified three overall patterns.
First, the average duration of migration for those arriving 
in Greece via the Eastern Mediterranean route was 
considerably shorter than that found for those arriving 
via the Central Mediterranean route to Italy or Malta 
(Figure 5). Indeed, nearly two thirds (62%) of those who 
were interviewed in Greece arrived within six months of 
departure from their country of origin, compared with 
only 29% of those who were interviewed in Italy and 
Malta. And whilst 39% arrived in Greece within one 
month, only 1% did so in Italy and Malta. These rapid 
journeys were most common among respondents from 
Iraq, 86% of whom arrived in less than one month, 
and Syria, 45% of whom arrived in Greece less than 
one month after leaving their country (Figure 6).
Second, for those arriving via the Central Mediterranean 
route it was more likely for several months to have 
passed since they departed from their place of origin 
than for those travelling across the Eastern route.  
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Figure 5: Duration of migration by country of arrival through the Eastern Mediterranean 
route to Greece and Central Mediterranean route to Italy and Malta (in months) 
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Only 13% of those arriving in Greece had been travelling 
for 7-18 months compared with one third (31%) of those 
arriving in Italy. In fact, among respondents travelling 
through the Central Mediterranean route, only those 
from the Maghreb countries were able to travel quickly. 
For most respondents, migration to Europe was the 
culmination of a much lengthier process involving both 
short and/or long stops in various locations. This was 
particularly the case for people originating in West 
African countries, who had often stopped in countries 
within the region and in Libya prior to moving onward 
across the sea (Figure 7). People passing through 
Libya spent, on average, seven months there. 
Third, many of those travelling along both routes had left 
their country of origin years before arriving in Europe. 
Over one fifth (22%) of those interviewed in Greece 
and nearly one third (31%) of those interviewed in Italy 
had left their countries of origin more than 18 months 
previously32. This pattern featured particularly strongly 
among Afghans who arrived in Greece, often after 
residing in Iran where the average length of a stay was 
Figure 6: Duration of migration for Syrian and Iraqi nationals to Greece (in months)
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32  These numbers do not add to 100%. This is due to a lack of complete information on duration of journeys for some of our interviewees.
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three and a half years. For Eritreans similarly, the time 
between departure from the home country and arrival in 
Europe was particularly lengthy as some had stayed for 
extended periods in Sudan, Egypt or Israel (Figure 8).
This overview shows the diverse geography of routes 
and timescales for migration of those arriving in 
Europe in 2015. At the same time it also highlights 
patterns of convergence of migration patterns into 
more or less discernible routes that led towards 
southern Europe. The question, however, is how and 
why these diverse migration flows came together to 
form the Eastern and Central Mediterranean routes. 
To explain that, we need to take a closer look at 
how these movements evolved and developed.
Unpacking migration patterns
The previous section set out the geography of 
the journeys that made up the different routes 
to and across the Mediterranean. In this section 
we will look at these varied movements in more 
detail, with particular focus on when and why 
Figure 7: Duration of migration for nationals from West, East and Central African countries (in months)
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people stopped or had their journeys interrupted, 
and when and why they then moved on.
The way that these journeys and stops fit together 
is central to our understanding of the nature 
of the migration patterns to and across the 
Mediterranean. Drawing on our data we can identify 
three distinct types of migration characterised 
by varying patterns of migration and stops:
•	 	One-off	migration	between	two	places,	usually	
through relatively direct and fast journeys, which 
may be interspersed only by short stops; 
•	 	Longer	migration	trajectories	of	separate	
journeys linked together, interrupted by 
longer stops in one or more countries;
•	 	Serial	migration	of	consecutive	movements,	separated	
by periods spent in one or more different locations, 
from which onward movement can be considered 
a separate migration experience driven by its own 
motivations, decision-making, planning and aspirations.
It is important to note that these three types of migration 
are not always easily differentiated. For example, many 
individuals did not consider themselves to be on a 
‘migration trajectory’ at the outset but made decisions 
to move on in response to the particular situation 
in which they had found themselves (see Section 3). 
Figure 8: Duration of migration for Eritrean and Afghan nationals to Greece and Italy combined (in months)
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Others may have intended to move quickly between 
two places but found that it was impossible to do so 
or chose to stay in a particular place due to their own 
shifting personal or family circumstances. Nonetheless, 
understanding these different types of movement is 
important and necessary in order to better understand 
the dynamics of migration in the Mediterranean region 
and, in particular, to unpack the ways in which these 
dynamics fed into the arrival of people to Europe via 
the Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes.
The nature of stops and stays
Focusing on the nature of stops and stays helps us to 
highlight the difference between more or less unified and 
direct journeys to Europe and longer-term, often fragmented 
trajectories and serial migration decisions. Whilst people 
often made multiple stops in different countries before 
arriving in Europe the number of stops made in different 
countries varied significantly (Figure 9). Respondents 
made, on average, three or four stops within Turkey 
whilst in Libya the average was only two, for example.
In most cases, the initial journeys from countries 
of origin were directed towards nearby locations: 
many Syrians often made a first stop within Syria, 
becoming internally displaced before subsequently 
moving across an international border. 
 I was living in Raqqa. We went by car to
 another area in Raqqa which was 
controlled by the regime … [then] we went to 
Palmyra, and from there to Damascus [then] we 
went by coach to the border with Lebanon.”
(Syrian man travelling with his wife and four children 
aged 11, 7 and 4 years old and baby aged 8 months)
It was also common for West and East Africans 
to initially move to nearby towns or cities to find 
safety, such as the case of Gambians stopping in 
Casamance on the border with Senegal, or Eritreans 
making their first stop in a refugee camp near the 
border between Eritrea and Ethiopia or Sudan.
 I spent one year and two months in the 
 Adi-Harush refugee camp, it was organised 
by UNHCR. There was multiple people, many 
many people there … life was bad, there was a 
shortage of food, no communication and I had 
no communication with my family or the world 
outside. So I left the camp to go to Sudan.”
(Eritrean man, 36 years old awaiting relocation within 
the EU)
It is clear from our research that stops and stays are 
of a qualitatively different nature and that they can 
have various potential functions for those on the 
move. They can be intended or unintended, voluntary 
or forced. Some of those we spoke to described 
decisions to stop in a town or city in order to rest, 
settle, work, obtain resources or connect with onward 
transport. Others were forced to stop or stay due to 
violence and conflict, experiences of crime, a lack 
of money, kidnappings, detention or poor health. 
Some stops were short in duration providing sufficient 
time to rest, gather resources, arrange transportation 
and move onwards. Indeed, certain countries were 
more clearly places where people had only ever 
intended to stop for a short time. Involuntary stops 
were also widely reported as a result of violence, 
arrest or kidnappings, such as on the borders of 
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Figure 9: Number of stops and stays by country made by all of our interviewees (n = 500) 
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Chad and Sudan as well as in Libya that would see 
migrants and refugees kept in prisons until a ransom 
had been paid to release them. These short stops 
can be qualified as either a voluntary or involuntary 
interruption a relatively unified journey. Others, by 
contrast, were of medium or extended duration and 
reflected an intention on the part of an individual to stay 
and reside in that particular location. They can thus 
be characterised as a ‘stay’ rather than just a ‘stop’. 
Those who had decided to stay usually had no initial 
intention of moving on whereas those who had stopped 
temporarily viewed this as punctuating a broader 
migration trajectory which had a distinct location as its 
intended destination. The decision to stay or move on 
is discussed in more detail in Section 3 of the report.
Serial migration and longer-term trajectories
Whilst some migration experiences were, as we have 
noted, relatively short and direct, this was certainly 
not the case for everyone. For around a quarter of 
all of our respondents it is clear that the countries to 
which they had originally travelled – including Iran, 
Sudan, Libya – were initially perceived as destination 
countries where they intended to settle and live. This 
conclusion is supported by the fact that over 2.5 
million refugees continue to live in Turkey and over 
980,000 in Iran, for example. For another group of 
respondents, around half, these countries were viewed 
as places of at least temporary residence to which 
people had travelled before moving on elsewhere. 
Often, during these longer periods of stay people 
worked, ran a business, rented accommodation or even 
applied for immigration status (from the authorities 
or on the black market). People experienced some 
degree of integration into local social systems. In 
many cases they did not intend to move on until there 
was a particular change in their circumstances. As 
a result, their onward migration can be considered 
a separate migration experience driven by its own 
motivations, decision-making, planning and aspirations. 
Eritreans were involved in perhaps the most complex 
migration processes and journeys, often including stays 
of over a year to try to settle in places as diverse as 
Sudan (five interviewees) or Egypt (two interviewees), 
as well as two men who lived for over five years in Israel 
and one who lived in Uganda for two years. The decision 
to move on came only when economic opportunities 
appeared to have run out, when corruption was seen 
as too much of an obstacle or when new situations of 
insecurity arose. Similarly, many respondents from West 
African countries and from Bangladesh had intended 
to stay in Libya for work, but no longer felt safe there. 
We also interviewed Syrians who had intended to stay 
permanently in Egypt until the government of Abdeh 
Fattah el-Sisi brought in increasing restrictions and 
repression in everyday life, and Palestinian refugees 
who had resided for many years, or been born, in 
Syria before being displaced by the conflict.
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 I’m originally from Daraa. I left in  
 December 2012. We decided to …
go to Egypt. We took a plane from Amman to 
Alexandria. President Morsi was still there and 
Syrians could enter by plane. They were welcome 
in Egypt. I lived there about a year and a half. …I 
worked as a transporter of goods by truck. …When 
the Morsi Government fell and el-Sisi arrived 
things for Syrians changed. Strong discrimination. 
Even renewing a residence permit was difficult. 
So I went to Libya. …Libya is terrible. …I set aside 
money to leave and I took the boat to Italy.”
(Syrian man aged 23, interviewed in Italy)
The longest average time spent in any given country 
prior to arrival in Europe was Iran (3.5 years). Indeed, 
a quarter (27%) of those who had been living in Iran 
had stayed there for between 10 to 40 years. These 
were all Afghans who had left Afghanistan due to 
conflict. For these refugees and migrants, the decision 
to travel to Europe should be understood as part of 
a broader pattern of serial migration and multiple, 
sometimes entirely unrelated, decisions to migrate. 
Regular and irregular 
border crossings
Both the media and politicians often give the impression 
that all those arriving in Europe have crossed all the 
borders on their journey irregularly (without passports 
or other documents). Our findings challenge this 
assumption. Whilst it is true that all respondents who 
arrived in Greece and Italy did so irregularly due, 
primarily, to a lack of safe and legal routes, this was not 
necessarily the case for journeys through other countries 
prior to reaching Europe. Indeed, there were significant 
differences between diverse countries and across 
groups of refugees and migrants, depending on their 
access to documents and other resources. Among the 
Syrian respondents, some people had entered Turkey 
regularly and others crossed the border irregularly. None 
of the Afghans had visas to enter Turkey: all entered 
irregularly. More than two thirds of Iraqi nationals 
entered Turkey legally using a passport and either 
flew to Istanbul, Ankara or Izmir or took the coach. 
It is also important to note a number of important policy 
developments which seem likely to have influenced 
migration dynamics to Turkey. During 2014 and 2015, 
the MENA states (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) 
followed by Jordan and Lebanon imposed harsher 
visa restrictions on Syrian nationals, and increasingly 
policed their informal border crossings. By the spring 
of 2015, this restriction on possible exits out of Syria 
left Turkey as the main route to escape. Although the 
Turkish government closed the border in March 2015, 
except for those granted medical exceptions, Syrians 
continued to cross informally with the help of smugglers. 
In contrast, those travelling in West Africa were 
able to move relatively freely and regularly within 
the area of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), aside from occasionally 
having to pass security checkpoints. The situation 
changed for many of those we interviewed when 
they went to Libya: the irregular sea journey across 
the Central Mediterranean was considered to be 
the only way to leave what was rapidly becoming an 
increasingly dangerous and unsustainable situation. 
Irregular border crossings were not only associated 
with entering another country: respondents from Eritrea 
and Afghans living in Iran, for example, commented 
Section 2  Not one movement but many: unpacking migration to Europe
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on the restrictions faced in leaving these countries 
and the need for them to leave using irregular means. 
Respondents from both Iraq and Syria similarly told 
us that travel restrictions imposed by Islamic State 
(IS) meant that irregular crossings were necessary 
to reach safety. In this context the use of smugglers 
became an integral part of the migratory process. 
We explore this issue further in Section 4. 
Experiences of violence and death
As was noted in the introduction to our report, the 
dramas and hardships of the journey across the 
Mediterranean formed an important element of the ‘crisis’ 
constructed by politicians and the media. Experiences of 
violence and death are not limited to the sea crossing, 
rather they can be found along much of the journey to 
Europe, although our research has identified significant 
differences between the experiences of those who 
arrived via the Central and Eastern Mediterranean 
routes. Table 1 shows the extent to which people from 
different countries of origin experienced violence or 
witnessed death during their migration to Europe. 
In general terms, refugees and migrants who enter 
Europe via the Central Mediterranean route were 
more likely to report experiences of physical violence, 
exploitation or death (having seen someone killed or die) 
on the journey to Europe than those crossing via the 
Eastern Mediterranean route. More than three quarters 
(76%) of respondents who were interviewed in Italy and 
Malta said that they had directly experienced physical 
violence and nearly a third (29%) had witnessed the 
death of fellow travellers. Yet we also found variations in 
experiences according to the nationality and gender of 
respondents. For example, 95% of the Gambians and 
Nigerians we met told us they had experienced violence 
on the journey, and over 80% of Nigerian women 
described experiences of exploitation including having to 
engage in transactional sex to pay for their journeys, as 
well as sex trafficking. The majority of these experiences 
occurred in Algeria, Niger and, above all, Libya. 
Those who were interviewed in Italy and Malta 
described a number of situations that were considered 
particularly dangerous, such as border crossings 
in Eritrea manned by snipers or journeys through 
Niger squeezed onto pick-ups and driven through 
the desert, with a high risk of dying from drought, 
starvation or falling from the vehicle. On the journey 
through Chad or Sudan our interviewees frequently 
experienced forced stops at military checkpoints and 
traps set by militia or ‘bandits’. Kidnappings were 
common, although it was often unclear whether the 
perpetrators were ‘bandits’, militia organisations 
or even the military of that particular country. 
The vast majority of the experiences of violence, 
exploitation and death of people occurred in Libya 
where racism and racial discrimination against Black 
African migrants has been documented for many 
years. Experiences of being kidnapped, arbitrarily 
arrested, held up at gunpoint or not paid for a day’s 
work were described by almost all of our interviewees. 
Over a quarter had witnessed death: someone shot, 
die from hunger or drown. Women spoke of being 
unable to leave their places of residence and being 
subject to sexual as well as physical violence. Such 
experiences appear to be more or less indiscriminate.
Whilst a significant proportion of those crossing 
to Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean route had 
experienced violence and death in their countries of 
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origin (see Section 3) a smaller – but not insignificant – 
proportion of respondents experienced violence (40%) 
or death (8.5%) compared with those travelling through 
various African countries and arriving via the Central 
Mediterranean route. Among refugees and migrants 
from the three largest nationality groups arriving in 
Greece (Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis), violence was 
widespread but there was variation in the circumstances 
under which this violence occurred. Around a quarter 
of Iraqis (27%) and over a third of Syrians (37%) told 
us that they had experienced violence after leaving their 
country of origin. This figure was much higher at 65% 
for Afghan respondents, many of whom were of the 
Hazara ethnic group and had been subject to racism 
and discrimination whilst living in Iran (see Section 3). 
As with respondents who were interviewed in Italy and 
Malta, some routes and locations were perceived by 
respondents as being more dangerous than others.
Around half (51%) of those who had travelled through 
Iran, experienced violence, most notably at the hands of 
state agents (police, border guards and the military).  
A fifth (19%) reported death occurring to someone they 
knew or saw along the way. Many respondents in Greece 
and Turkey told us that the route through Iran into Turkey 
was the most dangerous due to threats of death and 
violence from smugglers, because of the geography of 
the mountains but particularly due to the Iranian army 
who are known to shoot at those who attempted to 
cross the border. Of those respondents who travelled 
through Sudan, 14% experienced violence. Overall, 
the route through Turkey and Greece was generally 
considered less dangerous than travelling through Libya. 
This may have contributed to increased arrivals into 
Greece relative to Italy: several Eritrean respondents 
described making a deliberate decision to travel to 
Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean route because the 
journey through Libya was considered too dangerous.
Section 2  Not one movement but many: unpacking migration to Europe
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 Nationality % death % exploitation % violence
 Gambia 51.1 55.6 95.6
 Nigeria 28.6 59.5 95.2
 Ghana 66.7 38.1 81.0
 Senegal 20.0 40.0 80.0
 Ivory Coast 21.4 28.6 78.6
 Afghanistan 20.5 9.1 77.3
 Mali 28.6 71.4 71.4
 Pakistan 17.6 29.4 52.9
 Syria 6.5 20.4 37.0
 Eritrea 8.3 27.8 36.1
 Iraq 0.0 6.9 31.0
 Yemen 0.0 10.0 20.0
 Table 1:  % of respondents reporting experiences of violence, exploitation or witnessing death since leaving 
their country of origin (includes only origin countries with 10 or more respondents)
 Gender % death % exploitation % violence
 Nigerian Male 34.48 62.07 100.00
 Nigerian Female 7.69 61.54 84.62
 Syrian Male 7.37 17.89 33.68
 Syrian Female 0.00 38.46 61.54
 Table 2:  % of respondents reporting experiences of violence, exploitation or witnessing death since leaving 
Nigeria and Syria, by gender
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One of the main objectives of our research has been to 
better understand the drivers of migration across the 
Mediterranean including the underlying factors shaping 
migration from countries of origin. Whilst some of our 
findings are consistent with those of other studies35, 
others are rather more surprising and reflect the complex 
‘back stories’ described in the previous section. In 
particular, many respondents had not travelled directly 
to Europe but had rather travelled through a wide range 
of countries before eventually deciding to cross the 
Mediterranean. For many of these people Europe had 
never been an intended destination, whilst for others, 
particularly those with family members already living 
in European countries, it was the obvious choice36.
Having unpacked the routes taken by our research 
respondents, we turn our attention in this section to the 
factors that shaped the decision to leave their home 
countries and, in the case of those who spent extended 
periods of time in a number of other countries, the 
Section 3
The decision to leave – and move on 
Key points
Conflict in the countries neighbouring Europe was a major factor contributing to the significant increase 
in the number of refugees and migrants arriving in 2015 both as a cause of primary and secondary movement. 
More than three quarters (77%) of respondents explicitly mentioned factors that could be 
described as ‘forced migration’. The figure was even higher at 91% for those interviewed in Greece 
reflecting the significant proportion of Syrians in our sample. 
There is often a complex and overlapping relationship between ‘forced’ and ‘economic’ drivers of 
migration to Europe. Many of those who left their home countries primarily due to economic reasons found 
themselves in situations of conflict and violence in Libya and elsewhere. 
Others, even if they had decided to leave home due to conflict, subsequently had to move on again because 
they were unable to make a living or access healthcare and education. A third of respondents interviewed in 
Greece had moved on for what might typically be understood as economic reasons. 
There were significant differences between those interviewed in Greece and Italy as to whether they 
intended to stay in the first European country in which they had arrived. Virtually none of those who were 
interviewed in Greece intended to stay compared to more than two thirds (68%) of those interviewed in Italy. 
35 See fn. 25 
36  Preferred destination countries are not a focus of this report but have been explored in detail with reference to respondents travelling to Europe via the Eastern 
Mediterranean route in an earlier MEDMIG Research Brief, see Crawley, H., Duvell, F., Jones, K. and Skleparis, D. (2016) Understanding the dynamics of migration to 
Greece and the EU: drivers, decisions and destinations, MEDMIG Research Brief No.2 http://www.medmig.info/research-brief-02-Understanding-the-dynamics-of-
migration-to-Greece-and-the-EU.pdf 
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decision to continue onwards towards Europe. This is 
important, in part to give voice to the diverse stories of 
individuals and families who ended up risking their lives 
to cross the Mediterranean, but also because EU policy 
has been underpinned by a number of assumptions about 
the drivers and motivations of those on the move. In 
January 2016 for example, the Dutch Commissioner Frans 
Timmermans claimed, incorrectly, that “More than half of 
the people now coming to Europe come from countries 
where you can assume they have no reason whatsoever 
to ask for refugee status …more than half, 60%”37.
These assumptions about the legitimacy or otherwise of 
the asylum claims of those seeking international protection 
took different forms in relation to the Eastern and Central 
Mediterranean routes. In the case of the former, there 
was generally an acknowledgement that the majority of 
those who arrived in Greece during the course of 2015 
came from countries in which there was well-documented 
conflict and human rights abuse (most notably Syria, 
Afghanistan and Iraq). But there was also an implicit, and 
sometimes explicit, assumption that having escaped the 
violence these people should remain in neighbouring 
countries, most notably Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. 
At the recent UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants 
held in New York in September 2016, for example, EU 
Commissioner Avramopolous said that “we need to make 
their journey to a safe place shorter and easier… those 
seeking protection should find a safe place as close as 
possible to their country of origin – even in a safe part 
of their country”38. The decision to move to Greece and 
onwards into northern Europe was perceived by politicians 
and policy makers, and in turn the public, to be motivated 
primarily by a desire to access work and welfare support. 
In the case of Italy, there was a perception among 
politicians, policy makers and the public that, 
because many of those travelling through the Central 
Mediterranean route originated from countries that 
were not affected by conflict – or at least not conflicts 
that were widely publicised or understood – they 
were mostly ‘economic migrants’ seeking employment 
and a better life. As a result, those arriving in Italy 
were perceived as being ‘less deserving’ than those 
travelling through the Eastern Mediterranean route, 
particularly those from Syria whose claims for asylum 
were effectively fast-tracked. This is reflected in the 
fact that refugee recognition rates decreased for those 
arriving in Italy over the course of 201540. As with 
those travelling through the Eastern Mediterranean 
route, there was a perception that arrivals in Italy were 
largely a consequence of ‘pull factors’ in Europe which 
encouraged refugees and migrants to make their 
dangerous journeys. This increasingly outdated but still 
popular ‘push-pull’ model of migration underpins a raft 
of policy decisions, including the downscaled and then 
reinstated search and rescue (SAR) operations which 
were believed to encourage others to risk the crossing41.
This section is divided into two main parts. We begin 
by examining the reasons why people decided to leave 
their home countries. We then examine the reasons why, 
having reached another country in which they had lived 
for months or even years, people decided to move on.
37 http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/most-fleeing-to-europe-are-not-refugees-eu-official-says-1.2511133
38 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3121_en.htm
39  See for example, Reuters (2015) Migranti, Alfano: rimpatriare quelli economici, Ue partecipi economicamente a ‘hotspot’, Reuters Italia, http://it.reuters.com/article/
topNews/idITKBN0OX1NI20150617
40  This issue is explored in more detail in an earlier MEDMIG Research Brief, see McMahon, S. and Sigona, N. (2016) Boat migration across the Central Mediterranean: 
drivers, experiences and responses, MEDMIG Research Brief No.3 http://www.medmig.info/research-brief-03-Boat-migration-across-the-Central-Mediterranean.pdf 
41  Hagen-Zanker, J. and Mallett, R. (2016) Journeys to Europe: The Role of Policy in Migrant Decision-Making, ODI Insights https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/10297.pdf  
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The decision to leave
According to IOM data, nearly 82% of those arriving 
in Greece and Italy in 2015 originated from just four 
countries – Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Eritrea – 
countries experiencing protracted political unrest and 
conflict and which have a well-documented record 
of human rights abuse42. Whilst the factors driving 
migration are complex and vary among those travelling 
to Europe via the Eastern and Central Mediterranean 
routes, our research confirms that conflict in the 
countries neighbouring Europe – most notably the 
war in Syria which started in March 2011 – as well 
as in the countries to which refugees and migrants 
subsequently moved, was a major factor contributing 
to the significant increase in the number of refugees 
and migrants who arrived in Europe in 2015. 
When we asked our respondents to describe the 
circumstances under which they had decided 
to leave, more than three quarters (77%) of 
respondents across the entire sample explicitly 
mentioned factors that could be described as ‘forced 
migration’, including conflict, persecution, violence, 
death threats and human rights abuse. The figure 
was even higher at 91% for those interviewed 
in Greece, reflecting the significant proportion 
of Syrians who travelled through this route. 
 I left because of the war. There is no safety 
 in Yemen. You might die any minute…  
In Yemen, there is no electricity, the schools have 
closed and it is not safe to be on the streets.  
War has no mercy.”
(Yemeni man aged 20)
  I was living in Damascus. The situation  
 was bad. I was working as a civil servant 
for 16 years. We were living on rent, expensive rent. 
The schools closed down. The regime was dropping 
bombs every day. There was no future there. I decided 
to leave one year ago from Syria for my children. 
Everybody leaves Syria for the sake of their children.” 
(Syrian man aged 35 travelling to Germany to join his 
wife and four children)
The situation among those travelling to Europe via the 
Central Mediterranean route is rather more complicated. 
Whilst the composition of flows is significantly more 
diverse in terms of the countries from which refugees and 
migrants originate, many of those who arrived had spent 
significant periods of time in Libya and other countries 
in which there is conflict and in which certain groups, 
in particular Black Africans, are known to experience 
significant racism, discrimination and violence. Nearly 
two thirds (66%) of those who were interviewed in 
Italy made reference to factors associated with ‘forced 
migration’ when describing the reasons they decided to 
leave their home country. Many more had experienced 
conflict, persecution and human rights in the countries 
to which they subsequently moved, most notably Libya. 
Notwithstanding these differences in terms of the different 
countries of origin of those moving through the Eastern 
and Central Mediterranean routes, our research identifies 
a number of cross-cutting drivers of migration to Europe.
The first and perhaps most obvious driver of migration 
across the Mediterranean to Europe is conflict and the 
daily uncertainty regarding life and future. Many of those we 
42 IOM (2016) fn. 2
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spoke to had not been specifically targeted but had decided 
to leave their countries because the levels of generalised 
violence had become intolerable and they consequently 
feared for their personal safety and that of their families. 
These included a large number of Syrians who were 
living in areas of conflict in Syria and who were subject to 
almost daily barrel bombings, sniper fire and other attacks. 
Homs, Damascus and Aleppo were frequently mentioned 
as cities in which it had become impossible to live. 
This was also a recurrent theme in interviews with 
respondents from Iraq, where there has been a protracted 
conflict which began with the 2003 invasion by a US-led 
coalition and more recently has seen intensified conflict with 
IS. Towards the end of the fieldwork phase (January 2016) 
we started to meet a growing number of Yemenis who had 
moved due to escalating bombing raids on civilian areas by 
Saudi Arabia. Peoples’ sense of uncertainty, fear of death 
and lack of hope for the future ran through these accounts.
Others had been specifically targeted in the context of 
political unrest and conflict across the wide range of 
countries from which our respondents originated. On the 
Eastern Mediterranean route this included: a member of the 
opposition Pakistan People’s Party in Pakistan; a Syrian man 
who was arrested and imprisoned because the authorities 
thought he would participate in a political protest; an MP 
who opposed the actions of the Assad regime; an Airforce 
Colonel who was tortured for refusing to drop barrel bombs; 
and a former solider in Assad’s army who left and became 
a founder of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Respondents 
who had been journalists, humanitarian and NGO workers 
and activists were also targeted in Syria and Iraq. 
A number of those travelling through the Central 
Mediterranean route had also decided to leave their 
homes due to political persecution or localised situations 
of civil unrest. Respondents from places as diverse 
as Gambia, Nigeria and Pakistan spoke of violence 
due to their membership of a political party, the threat 
of imprisonment and facing corrupt or unfair legal 
processes. Nearly a third (29%) of Nigerian women 
who were interviewed told us that the murder of a 
close, usually male, family member – husband, brother, 
father – had destabilised both their personal security 
and their livelihood. This combination of political and 
economic factors underpinned the decision to leave.
 My uncle was an MPP organiser for a 
 political party, I supported him to win an 
election but the people started fighting him every 
day. Somebody gave me information to escape 
because they were planning an attack on me. I ran 
to a nearby town but people knew that I was there 
so I had to leave the country.”
(Ghanaian man aged 37)
  I was living in Baghdad. You don’t know 
when you are going to die there.”
(Iraqi man aged 28 travelling with his wife and four year 
old son)
 I’m an activist. I had a problem with the 
 government because I speak out, I speak 
for the people. My husband was murdered and I 
was in danger.”
(Nigerian woman aged 37)
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On the Central Mediterranean route respondents 
also described having to leave because of escalating 
tensions between Muslims and Christians in some 
countries (most notably some areas of Nigeria), 
intergenerational conflicts related to family and marriage 
(including familial conflicts arising from an individual’s 
choice of partner), religious obligations which 
sometimes manifested themselves as violent rituals, 
together with land disputes and fights among extended 
families. Tensions around religious and fraternity 
affiliations leading to physical violence and even the 
murder of close family members were recurrent themes 
in our interviews with Nigerian men in particular. Whilst 
these conflicts may be localised or regional – and 
therefore not well understood by the international 
community – they represented a significant threat to the 
lives of those affected.
Outside of these experiences of generalised conflict 
and political violence, we identified three themes 
that cut across the experiences of those who arrived 
in Greece and Italy and featured in the accounts 
of a significant proportion of those interviewed, 
albeit to varying degrees across the two routes: 
terrorism or armed insurgency, kidnapping and the 
risk and/or fear of indefinite forced conscription.
 I tried to fight back with the Muslims 
 [Boko Haram] but I had to run away. I had 
nothing in Nigeria. They burned everything. There 
was nothing left there. They tried to kill me.”
(Nigerian man aged 26) 
More than a quarter (28%) of respondents interviewed 
in Greece said that a significant factor in their 
decision to leave was the activities of IS, particularly 
in Syria but also in Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. 
These respondents had been detained, tortured 
or forced to watch beheadings. They expressed 
grave concerns for the safety of their families, and 
particularly women (wives, sisters, daughters) who 
were perceived to be non-compliant with strict Sharia 
laws concerning their dress and behaviour. Whilst the 
activities of IS were not prevalent in the accounts of 
those travelling through the Central Mediterranean 
route, respondents whose journeys originated in 
West Africa described the threat posed by armed 
groups such as the Movement of Democratic Forces 
of Casamance in Senegal, terrorist organisations 
including Boko Haram and particular confraternities, 
such as Black Axe in Nigeria. A number of respondents 
interviewed in both Italy and Greece also described 
violence at the hands of terrorist groups in East 
African countries including Al Shabaab in Somalia.
 Most probably, it’s the regime which 
 conducts the kidnaps but you can never be 
sure. In 2013, regime soldiers came in my house 
and kidnapped me. I spent two months in prison. 
I was being beaten up every day [Respondent 
shows the interviewer burn marks from cigarettes 
on his body]. I spent 25 days in the hospital. I later 
learned that the regime had written in their report 
that I was involved with the FSA.”
(Syrian man aged 56 travelling with his 27 year old son)
Section 3  The decision to leave – and move on
41
Respondents from Syria and Iraq described kidnapping 
by State and non-State agencies (including a range 
of militia groups) as an increasingly common threat to 
their safety and that of their families. In some cases 
individuals were targeted because they were perceived 
to be a threat. More commonly however people were 
targeted because they had resources and were viewed 
as being able to pay a significant ransom. Those with 
resources were therefore most at risk. Kidnapping also 
featured strongly in the accounts of those interviewed 
in Italy but was typically associated with life in Libya 
rather than the home country (discussed below).
 I was living in Damascus. I was scared 
 about my daughter’s life. We were rich, 
and whoever is rich is in danger of having their 
children kidnapped.”
(Syrian Palestinian woman aged 43 travelling with her 
six year old daughter)
For Eritreans, Syrians and Afghans living in Iran, the risk and/
or fear of forced indefinite conscription into the government 
army, militia or rebel force was a major factor underlying the 
decision to leave. Eritreans who were interviewed in both 
Greece and Italy described military conscription as a form of 
forced or slave labour with poor quality working conditions, 
low or no salary and no prospects of release43. Several 
Afghans, including one child aged 16, also told us that 
they had been forcibly conscripted into the Iranian army 
to support the Assad regime in Syria44.
 I was working as a teacher in Ashmara. I 
 was also working as an artist. I decided to 
leave because I was imprisoned more than once by 
the government. I was imprisoned for the first time 
when I was in college and for the second time, after 
my graduation… After I graduated and even though 
I had already started working as a teacher, they 
wanted to send me to SAWA45. I told them I can’t go 
and they sent me to prison again for 4 months. It is 
an underground prison. I was living with almost 1000 
people. That was when I decided to leave this country.”
(Eritrean man aged 34)
 I couldn’t stand living in Eritrea any longer. 
 I was working for nothing. There are no 
rights, no constitution and no justice. There is 
poverty and endless national service.”
(Eritrean man aged 41)
This evidence from across the two routes suggests that 
there is often a complex and overlapping relationship 
between ‘forced’ and ‘economic’ drivers of migration 
to Europe. This issue is discussed at length in the 
existing literature46. Whilst there were differences in 
the composition of those moving through the Central 
and Eastern Mediterranean routes, by nationality, age, 
gender and religion, it is inaccurate to characterise 
them exclusively, or even predominantly, as being 
made up by either forced or economic migrants. 
43  UN Human Rights Council (2015) Report of Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea /HRC/29/42 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIEritrea/
Pages/ReportCoIEritrea.aspx  
44  Iran is fighting a proxy war in Syria in support of the Assad regime and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) has recruited thousands of undocumented Afghans 
living there to fight in Syria since at least November 2013  See https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/29/iran-sending-thousands-afghans-fight-syria  
45  The SAWA Defence Training Center is a military in the Gash-Barka region of Eritrea. It is where the Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) recruits and national service 
conscripts are sent for basic military training.
46  See, for example, Richmond, A.H. (1993) ‘Reactive migration: sociological perspectives on refugee movements’, Journal of Refugee Studies 6 (1), 7-24; Zetter, R. (2006) 
‘More labels, fewer refugees: remaking the refugee label in an era of globalisation’, Journal of Refugee Studies 20(2), 172-92; Long, K. (2013) ‘When refugees stopped 
being migrants: movement, labour and humanitarian protection’, Migration Studies 1(1), 4-26; Betts, A. (2014) Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of 
Displacement, Cornell University Press; Mainwaring, C. and Brigden, N. (2016) ‘Beyond the border: clandestine migration journeys’, Geopolitics 21(2), 243-262.
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In many of the countries from which respondents 
originated, protracted conflict and political unrest not 
only meant that people were fearful for their safety and 
that of their families but had undermined the ability to 
earn a livelihood and feed a family by killing primary 
breadwinners, destroying businesses and making it 
impossible to travel to work. In others, local conflicts 
between families and groups similarly undermined the 
security and economic wellbeing. Meanwhile many 
of those who left their home countries primarily due 
to economic reasons found themselves in situations 
of conflict and violence in Libya and elsewhere. 
We return to this issue and the policy challenges 
which it creates, in the conclusions to our report.
Moving on
One of the key findings of our research, discussed 
in detail in Section 2 of this report, is that many of 
those who crossed the Mediterranean in 2015 had 
not travelled directly from their countries of origin 
but rather had left months or even years beforehand. 
Some had stopped for short periods of time in order 
to rest, settle, work, obtain resources or connect 
with onward transport. Others had stayed in different 
countries outside Europe for longer periods of time 
in the hope of securing work and rebuilding a life.
As noted previously, the duration of time between 
departure from the country of origin and arrival in 
Europe was considerably higher for those who arrived 
in Italy compared with those arriving in Greece. 
However among some of those who were interviewed 
in Greece the length of time between leaving the 
home country and arriving in Europe was also 
considerable. Most notable among these respondents 
were Afghan nationals, many of whom had been 
living in – and in some cases were born – in Iran47. 
As noted in the previous section, some of those who 
crossed the Mediterranean in 2015 had a relatively clear 
and consistent objective point at which they departed from 
their home country. Their migration to Europe can therefore 
be regarded as a single journey, albeit with various stops 
or interruptions. For others however, there were stays of 
considerable duration in countries outside Europe and 
initially there had been no intention to move to Europe 
at all. These migrations, which are significant in number, 
cannot be interpreted as one and the same journey, rather 
they consist of separate or serial migration decisions. 
Unpacking the stops, stays and onward movement that 
follow these decisions highlights the complexity of the 
decision-making process and also ultimately helps us to 
better understand the dynamics of migration to Europe. 
The findings of our research suggest that it is important 
to differentiate between the primary drivers of migration 
from countries of origin and secondary drivers which 
lead to further migration and propel people onwards 
from the countries to which they subsequently move. 
In some cases the decision to move on was based on 
concerns about safety and security: Syrians living in 
Lebanon who felt too close to the ongoing conflict or 
that they might be located by Assad government officials 
and persecuted because of their political activities 
or affiliations; Eritreans who had left due to indefinite 
military conscription but were unable to rebuild their 
lives in Sudan due to civil war, or political activists who 
feared they would be found and forced to return.
47   More than three quarters (77%) of Afghan nationals interviewed in Greece had spent a considerable period of time in Iran (years rather than months) and several  
were born there.
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 In Sudan I was not safe. I had the fear of 
 getting arrested and sent back to Eritrea.  
I stayed in some friends’ house. I was hiding...  
I couldn’t risk living in Sudan for long time.”
(Eritrean woman aged 32) 
For many Afghans in Iran, particularly those from 
the ethnic Hazara minority, experiences of severe 
discrimination, the absence of citizenship rights and a 
lack of education for children combined with anxieties 
about what would happen to them if they were to 
return to Afghanistan and information from others that 
they might be able to secure protection in Europe, 
were associated with the decision to move on. 
 In Iran people were treating us as 
 animals. Refugees in Iran are in big 
trouble. They live a dark life. We wanted to go 
back to Afghanistan but we talked to our parents 
in Afghanistan and they told us that IS has 
increased its presence there. IS are persecuting 
Hazaras. They are beheading Hazaras. So we 
decided to go to Germany.”
(Hazara Afghan woman aged 28 travelling with her 
sister’s family)
It is also clear from our research that many of those 
who left situations of conflict often found themselves 
in very difficult economic circumstances in Jordan, 
Lebanon, Turkey, Iran and elsewhere as a result of limited 
rights, exploitation by employers and discrimination 
in the labour market (and beyond). A third (34%) of 
respondents interviewed in Greece, for example, had 
moved on for what might typically be understood 
as economic reasons: they were running out of 
money, found it impossible to secure employment 
or were working long hours for very little pay. 
 Back then I just wanted to leave Syria. 
 I wasn’t thinking of going to Europe. I 
had an acquaintance there. In two or three days I 
found a job as a waiter in a restaurant in Istanbul. 
I worked there for two months but I didn’t get 
paid. I left that job for another one. I was working 
from seven in the morning until midnight for 1,000 
liras, and I was sleeping in the restaurant too…
My wife joined me in Istanbul. We rented a house. 
At some point, our daughter got ill and we couldn’t 
take her to the hospital because we were illegal. 
This is when we decided to leave Turkey.”
(Syrian man aged 29 whose pregnant wife and one  
year old child were living in Sweden)
With the passage of time, and in the absence of a 
resolution to the conflicts in their home countries, 
respondents told us that they had grown increasingly 
concerned about the impacts on their families, and 
especially their children, many of whom had been out 
of schools for many years or had health issues. The 
arrival of significant numbers of people in Greece in 
2015 therefore raises important questions about the 
long-term situation for refugees and migrants living in 
countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, some of 
whom decided to cross the Mediterranean in 2015. 
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Key drivers of onward migration from Turkey48 
Turkey still maintains a geographic reservation on the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
which means that those from outside Europe are excluded from full refugee status (2013 Law on Foreigners 
and International Protection, art. 61). Syrians are dealt with under provisions for temporary protection (LFIP, art. 91) 
but the definition of ‘temporary’ is unclear which renders this status rather precarious. Meanwhile, they are 
excluded from asylum procedures.
All others are dealt with under provisions for asylum seekers and, if approved, granted a conditional refugee 
status (LFIP, art. 62) and are expected to be resettled or subsidiary protection (LFIP, art. 63). However, 
according to a report by the Council of Europe (2016), the waiting time for the first interview was seven 
years in 2015 and has now increased to eight years. This leaves people in periods of prolonged limbo. The 
demand for resettlement vastly outstrips the supply of places. Legal provisions as well as social services for 
unaccompanied children are considered insufficient. The risks of being returned to their countries of origin also 
undermines the security of those living in Turkey.
Syrians and some Iraqis can be accommodated in camps but there are currently only around 290,000 places 
i.e around 10% of the total number of refugees living in Turkey. All others have to identify and pay for their own 
accommodation. Usually, this is sub-standard and over-crowded and is in basements, sheds or derelict houses.
Until January 2016, all asylum seekers were excluded from the labour market and although Syrians have been 
entited to a work permit since that time in practice only around 2,000 have been issued. Therefore, Syrians and 
other refugees, if they can find employment, normally work in low paid sub-standard jobs. Many report severe 
exploitation and unpaid wages. Child labour appears to be widespread.
By law Syrians have access to some key social provisions including healthcare and education. However, often 
this cannot be realised due to lack of resources, staff or interpreters. For instance, 60% of Syrian children do 
not attend school. Very few benefits are paid. A significant numbers of NGOs, however, provide services and 
fill some gaps.
In summary, a large proportion of Syrians, Iraqis, and others living in Turkey suffer from a precarious immigration 
status, severe poverty and lack prospects for improvement. These conditions continue to represent pressures 
for onward migration.
48   See Directorate General of Migration Management (2013) Law on Foreigners and International Protection http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/eng_minikanun_5_son.pdf, 
Council of Europe (2016) Report of the fact-finding mission to Turkey by Ambassador Tomáš Bocˇek, Special Representative of the Secretary General on migration 
and refugees, 30 May – 4 June 2016 https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=0900001680699e93
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Secondary drivers of migration are also apparent among 
those travelling through the Central Mediterranean route. 
Those who had spent time in Libya repeatedly told us about 
their experiences of discrimination, exploitation and violence 
that undermined the ability to feel safe and make a living. 
 I learnt to be a builder in Libya …it was 
 stable. Everybody is working in Libya … 
because they destroy a house today and build it 
again tomorrow! In Libya people are not good, they 
treat you like slaves and call you ‘Africans’… there 
are guns everywhere but there is money in Libya.”
(Nigerian man aged 25)
 In Libya there is work and you can have 
 some money, I saw some friends and people 
who moved to Libya for work so I went to them… the 
country is not stable but there is work. I was almost two 
years in Libya, I did plumbing work, worked with an Arab 
man [Did he pay you?] He paid, but later he changed …  
I was staying in Murzuk it is a small village near Sabha,  
I rented a house. That place is not safe, sometimes 
there is fighting there, but it is only between the 
armies, the other sides and only their opponents.”
(Gambian man aged 31)
A fifth (20%) of respondents who travelled via the Central 
Mediterranean route referred to experiences of either being 
kidnapped or knowing others who had been kidnapped. 
Among Gambians and Eritreans this figure rose to more 
than 30%. There were numerous reports of successful and 
attempted kidnapping, often at gunpoint. Those who were 
kidnapped described being locked in small rooms with 
limited food and water and being subjected to beating and 
torture. In the case of Gambian respondents the purpose 
of the kidnapping appeared mostly to be to extract forced 
labour, whilst for Eritreans, who were often taken as part of 
a group, the purpose was most commonly to extract money 
from family members in the home country or living elsewhere. 
Understanding the experiences of refugees and migrants 
travelling through the Central Mediterranean route therefore 
requires an analysis not only of the situation in the countries 
from which they originate but also their experiences in 
Libya and other countries in which they have stopped 
or stayed. These experiences mean that even though 
the initial decision to migrate may have been motivated 
primarily by economic factors, many of those arriving in 
Italy and Malta had decided to leave Libya due to factors 
that are more typically associated with forced migration.
 One day a man said there’s a big project, 
 big work, so I put my things in the car and 
he drove me off and put me in prison. It was a 
kidnapping … there were lots of African people, and 
a few Asians too. I spent nine months in prison, it 
was too long… we were two, three, four days without 
food or water, many people lost their life there. [In the 
prison] you work for them, when somebody dies you 
have to move the body for them, they take you and 
tell you to throw the body in the ditch. It is inhuman.”
(Gambian man aged 31) 
 On the way we were kidnapped by a group 
 of armed people. We paid a ransom and 
were released. Some days after, while getting 
closer to Tripoli, they were kidnapped again. This 
time only 46 people were taken. They paid 500 
dollars each, sent by their parents, to be released.”
(Eritrean woman aged 19) 
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Finally, we found significant differences between 
those who travelled through the Eastern and Central 
Mediterranean routes with regard to whether the first 
European country in which they arrived – Greece and Italy 
respectively – was regarded as a place to stop or stay: in 
other words whether these were places that respondents 
intended to pass through on their way to another place 
or somewhere to live and work on a longer-term basis.
The difference between the two routes was striking. 
Virtually none of those who were interviewed in 
Greece considered that it was a country in which 
they would stay. There were exceptions: for example, 
a young Syrian man told us that his father had been 
living in Greece for 16 years and that he regarded 
the country as his second home. But most regarded 
Greece as a stopping point on their way to other parts 
of Europe. They were aware of the difficult economic 
circumstances facing the country and did not believe 
that it would offer them the opportunity to secure 
employment and rebuild their lives. For those with 
families who had been left behind, the ability to work 
and send money back in the form of remittances was 
an important factor driving the decision to move on.
 I am not going to apply for asylum here. 
 There is economic crisis in Greece. There 
are no jobs. I have heard that it is tough here.”
(Afghan man aged 21)
Key drivers of onward migration from Libya
Libya occupies a hugely important position in migration patterns towards Europe. Almost all (96%) of our 
interviewees departed on boats from Libya and the country has been a place of transit for those on their way to 
Europe for several years. But that does not tell the whole story.
Libya also continues to be a place of destination for refugees and migrants from a wide range of countries and 
backgrounds, from Africa, Asia and the Middle East. For many of those who we interviewed, Libya had been 
perceived as a place of plentiful economic opportunities, as it had in fact been for years before. The violent, 
chaotic reality of everyday life in the country was often unknown or underestimated.
Since 2011, Libya has been in a state of conflict with multiple armed groups controlling different parts of 
the country. For most of our interviewees, gunfire could be heard daily. And as well as the dangers of military 
operations, armed street gangs (known as ‘Asma Boys’) and unscrupulous employers willing to threaten or 
lock people up rather than pay them provided a frequent threat. This security environment impacted on the 
length of stops and stays for our respondents in ways that had often not been anticipated. Those who had little 
intention of staying in Libya often found their journeys interrupted and stays extended as a result of kidnapping 
and violence. Others who had intended to settle, work and live in Libya came to realise that they would have to 
move on again to find somewhere safe. In this way, violence and uncertainty play a vital role in curtailing stays 
and driving onward journeys from the country.
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By contrast more than two thirds (68%) of those 
in Italy who were asked about their preferred 
destination country said that they wanted to stay 
in the country. This was particularly clear among 
Gambians, Nigerians and Ghanaians who had 
arrived through the Central Mediterranean route 
from Libya and for Pakistani nationals, most of whom 
had travelled to Italy from Greece. The majority of 
those who wanted to stay in Italy had already applied 
for asylum at the time our interview with them.
The desire to remain in Italy was related in part to the 
perception that it would be possible to find opportunities 
for employment particularly in larger towns such as 
Rome, Milan and Naples. Some indicated that their 
intention to move away from smaller towns in search 
of opportunities for work once they had been granted 
legal status. Others expressed appreciation for the 
search and rescue operation that had effectively saved 
their lives and for the assistance that they had received 
at the hands of ordinary Italians and the local civic 
society who had welcomed them on arrival and helped 
them to settle. However for many, and most especially 
those from West and Central Africa, it was clear that 
Italy was also the first country they had reached in 
which they felt safe. This reinforces our finding that the 
decision to cross the Mediterranean from Libya was 
a separate migration decision: people had originally 
intended to remain there but had been unable to do 
so due to escalating violence. The accounts of these 
respondents are more typical of those who have been 
forced to migrate than those of economic migrants.
 As far as I am having my peace here, then I 
 want to stay.”
(Gambian man aged 18)
 We have nothing here, but at least we 
 have life.”
(Nigerian man aged 20)
© Will Rose / MSF
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The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
defines ‘smuggling of migrants’ as “the procurement, 
in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person 
into a State Party of which the person is not a national 
or a permanent resident”49. All of those who were 
interviewed in Greece and Italy engaged the services 
of a smuggler at some point along their journeys to 
Europe. Respondents paid smugglers to arrange the 
logistics of their journeys, including transportation, 
organising the route, providing false documents, 
purchasing boats, taking people to embarkation points, 
providing accommodation and purchasing flights as 
well as guiding people past dangerous borders. 
Section 4
Getting out, getting in: 
the role of smugglers 
Key points
All of our respondents engaged the services of a smuggler for at least one leg of their journey to Greece 
or Italy. This was primarily because they were unable to access a safe and legal route to safety/protection. 
One in ten of our interviewees who entered Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean route had tried but failed 
to identify an alternative way to migrate legally, for example by applying for a visa for work or study, a 
UN resettlement programme or family reunification.
Smugglers performed two main functions for our respondents: they helped respondents escape danger, 
conflict or persecution at home or en route and they enabled them to bypass controlled borders where 
these were a barrier to reaching safety, protection and/or livelihoods.
Smugglers were embedded in migrant social networks and local communities, and were easy  
to find. By far the majority of interviewees across both the Central and the Eastern routes found their 
smugglers through friends, family members and extended social networks, either at home or en route.  
State officials, the military, law enforcement, and border guards were also involved in smuggling. 
Our research found some manifestations of human trafficking along the Central Mediterranean 
route, in particular concerning women from Nigeria who were living in Libya. 
Although many of our respondents experienced violence and threats from smugglers (along both routes), 
violence also came from other actors including State officials, militias, military and the police. 
49   Available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/2011/04/som-indonesia/convention_smug_eng.pdf
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This section sets out our findings in relation to 
respondents’ use of, and relationship with, the 
smugglers who facilitated their journeys. It does 
three things: firstly, we outline the reasons why our 
respondents hired smugglers; secondly, we document 
the diversity of individuals involved in facilitating and 
their integration with migrant social networks; and thirdly, 
we consider whether our respondents’ experiences 
with those who facilitated their migration constituted 
‘smuggling’ or ‘trafficking’, as well as the experiences 
of violence with which both can be associated.
Reasons for the use of smugglers
Only a handful of respondents who crossed the 
Mediterranean in 2015 hired a smuggler at the point 
of departure from their home country to facilitate 
their movement all the way from their place of 
origin to Europe. Instead, the majority of refugees 
and migrants in our sample engaged smugglers to 
facilitate particular legs of the journey. This reflects 
the findings of Sections 2 and 3 that a significant 
proportion of those arriving in Europe in 2015 did so 
as a result of multiple migration decisions, rather than 
by making a single, direct journey. The findings of our 
research indicate that the point in which respondents 
engaged a smuggler was contingent on two factors:
•	 	Whether	smugglers	were	required	to	help	people	
escape conflict, danger, persecution at home 
or to facilitate the journey en route; and
•	 	Whether	individuals	could	travel	legally	or	without	
passing border and other controls at which 
travel documents and IDs were required. 
Getting out 
As is clear from the findings of our research into 
the drivers of migration in the previous section, 
many of those we interviewed were forced to leave 
their countries of origin and subsequently move 
as a result of conflict, persecution and human 
rights abuse. The role of smugglers in facilitating 
an essential escape route for people in such 
situations is well documented in the literature50. 
Almost half (43%) of the respondents interviewed in 
Greece had used a smuggler in order to get out of 
the country in which they were living. This included all 
the Afghan and Eritrean interviewees in our sample, a 
third of those travelling from Syria and a fifth of Iraqi 
respondents. For Syrian interviewees, a smuggler 
was required to help escape conflict or armed siege 
in their home cities of Aleppo, Daraa and Homs for 
which smugglers offered personal security. For those 
living in IS-controlled areas (e.g. Deir Al-Zor, Raqqa), a 
smuggler was also required as being caught attempting 
to leave without permission could result in detention or 
even their death according to respondents51. Similarly, 
respondents living in IS-controlled areas of Iraq engaged 
the assistance of smugglers to escape into Turkey.
Afghan nationals on the other hand engaged 
smugglers to escape the attention of the Iranian 
authorities. This was because, in addition to the 
discrimination, harassment and risk of forced 
conscription into Assad’s militias in Syria (see 
Section 3), it is illegal for Afghans to travel from city 
to city under Iranian law, making internal travel within 
50   See, for example, Crepeau, F. (2003) ‘The fight against migrant smuggling: migrant containment over refugee protection’ in J. Van Selm et al. (eds) The Convention at 
50: A View from Forced Migration Studies, Lanham: Lexington Books; UNODC (2011) Issue Paper: Smuggling of Migrants by Sea, http://www.unodc.org/documents/
human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/Issue-Papers/Issue_Paper_-_Smuggling_of_Migrants_by_Sea.pdf; Gallagher, A. and David, F. (2012) The International Law of 
Migrant Smuggling, New York: Cambridge University Press; Duvell, F.,  Yildiz, A. and Ozerim, G.  (2016 forthcoming) ‘Large-scale irregular departures in 2015 from 
Turkey: how can these be explained?; Journal for Ethnic and Migration Studies.
51  See also https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/21/islamic-state-capital-raqqa-syria-isis
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the country highly risky. Those who are caught risk 
detention or deportation back to Afghanistan52. 
 From Tehran we went to Urmia. We went by 
 car. We changed five cars in order to reach 
Urmia [border with Turkey]. And we had to switch 
off our mobile phones. We had to follow these 
steps in order to avoid army detection.” 
(Afghan Pashtun man, living in Iran for 10 years and 
travelling with his cousin)
Similarly, Eritrean respondents engaged the services of 
smugglers in order to escape the attention of the Eritrean 
authorities which detain those caught trying to leave 
the country53. One respondent even reported that the 
authorities have a ‘shoot to kill’ policy for those caught trying 
to leave. For a number of our Eritrean respondents who 
were fleeing military conscription (see Section 3), crossing 
the border out of Eritrea was especially dangerous. 
 We chose Sudan, because it is safer for 
 Eritreans to go there, than going to Ethiopia. 
Crossing the borders though is very dangerous. 
Soldiers have been told to shoot anyone trying 
to cross the border. I took a cell phone to contact 
my friends. I didn’t take any clothes except for 
those I was wearing, because clothes are visible 
and soldiers could realise that we were about to 
escape. I also took some food and water.”
(Eritrean man aged 34 travelling with his partner)
Smugglers did not only assist respondents to flee 
conflict and danger from the State authorities at 
home, they also helped them to navigate danger en 
route after leaving home. Thus, Eritreans crossing 
the border into Sudan also engaged the assistance 
of smugglers to escape the Rashaida tribe which 
controls part of the border, and which is feared for 
its reputation for kidnap, extortion and even murder54. 
Similarly, Afghans engaged smugglers to help them 
cross the challenging – and notoriously lawless – 
Nimroz region between Afghanistan and Iran, and the 
mountains between Iran and Turkey. In both places, 
interviewees feared the Iranian authorities which 
were (like the Eritrean authorities) reported to shoot 
at those who attempt to make the crossing, as well 
as ‘bandits’. As noted in Section 2 of this report, 
journeys can be extremely dangerous. Crossing the 
mountains into Turkey was reported by respondents to 
be especially dangerous and challenging. Commonly, 
to escape danger these smugglers divided their 
‘clients’ into groups before starting to climb the 
mountains, perceiving that separating people into 
smaller groups would attract less attention or that if 
one group were caught, another would get through55. 
Respondents who had travelled along the Central 
Mediterranean route also engaged smugglers to act 
as guides through difficult terrains that could not 
be traversed safely without expert knowledge and 
appropriate transportation. The only transport across the 
difficult terrain of the Sahara Desert was that organised 
by smugglers, since well before the fall of Gaddafi with 
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52   See Human Rights Watch (2013) Unwelcome Guests: Iran’s Violation of Afghan Refugee and Migrant Rights, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/11/20/unwelcome-
guests/irans-violation-afghan-refugee-and-migrant-rights 
53  See https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jun/08/human-rights-abuses-eritrea-may-be-crimes-against-humanity-un-report 
54  See http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/sudan-rashaida-kidnappers-demand-5000-ransom-threaten-death-eritrean-captives-1504974 
55   As these smugglers are paid upon safe arrival of their refugees and migrants in Turkey, they arguably have a greater financial incentive to ensure as many people arrive 
safely as possible. 
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security checkpoints manned by military and/or militia 
groups56. Travelling the Sahara by foot, without a robust 
vehicle, and without a driver who knew the way would 
lead to almost certain death. Whilst the smugglers who 
guided respondents over the mountains between Iran 
and Turkey divided people into smaller groups, smugglers 
in the Sahara organised their groups into convoys. 
 The journey in the Sahara was difficult and 
 it took us 10 days. There are no roads in the 
desert so you need to go with a truck.”
(Gambian man aged 18-29 years)
On entering Libya, the journeys – and lives – of 
our respondents became even more difficult (see 
Sections 2 and 3). Staying in Libya was dangerous, 
but so was leaving the country due to due to the risk 
of kidnap or murder by militias, authorities, police 
and ‘gangs’57. Engaging a smuggler to help leave the 
country via the Mediterranean was seen by many to 
be the only opportunity to leave this danger behind.
 When you enter Libya you cannot come 
 out, they will shoot you at the border. When 
we passed we saw a border guard pour petrol on 
a black man and set fire to him. You cannot get 
out of Libya alive … You have to give your money 
to someone and hope they will take you. They tell 
you, you must take the boat.”
(Nigerian woman aged 18-29 years)
Conversely, respondents who left their home countries 
without engaging the services of a smuggler did so 
because crossing the border was not in itself dangerous.
Getting in 
Section 2 noted that journeys were conducted 
partly regularly and partly irregularly depending on 
the availability or otherwise of safe and legal routes 
and the documentation required to cross the border. 
There is a significant body of existing research 
documenting how increased border / immigration 
controls and the closure of legal migration routes 
fuels the smuggling business58. A publication by 
one UN agency – the United Nations Office on 
Crime and Drugs (UNODC) whose mandate is to 
tackle human trafficking – refers to this as the “great 
paradox of enhanced immigration controls”, that 
borders do not by themselves stop people making 
these journeys. Rather that people will resort to hiring 
smugglers who can help them bypass immigration 
controls if they are not able to apply for visas or 
other legal means of entry to a place of safety59.
The findings of our research confirm this view. 
Smugglers helped our respondents avoid border 
controls or police, either through guiding people 
past them, providing false documents or paying 
bribes to officials. Respondents told us that where 
borders were especially heavily guarded, this 
always led to a greater presence of smugglers 
offering ways to avoid border controls. 
56   See Lutterbeck, D. (2013) ‘Across the desert, across the sea: migrant smuggling into and from Libya’ in P. Seeberg and Z. Eyadat (eds) Migration, Security and 
Citizenship in the Middle East: New Perspectives, Palgrave Macmillan
57  See, for example, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/02/libya-long-term-arbitrary-detentions 
58  See fn. 50
59   UNODC (2011, 44) The Role of Organised Crime in the Smuggling of Migrants from West Africa to the European Union, https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-
trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/Report_SOM_West_Africa_EU.pdf  
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 The smuggler came with a coach [to 
 Istanbul] and took us close to Izmir. And 
then we walked for two hours. More than 41 people 
in my group, three coaches in total, more than 10 
hours the journey to the coast. We were hiding from 
the police all the time. They caught other coaches 
but not ours. It was like a cat and mouse game.”
(Syrian man travelling with wife and baby daughter)
Not all of our respondents required the services of a 
smuggler to cross all national borders all the way along 
their journeys. As indicated in Section 2, some were 
able to travel parts of their routes completely legally or 
through crossing informal borders without checkpoints, 
or by paying a bribe to guards (by themselves rather 
than through smugglers). For instance, along the 
Eastern Mediterranean route, Moroccan and Iraqi 
respondents most commonly only hired smugglers 
upon arrival in Turkey. This was because they were 
able to travel with their own documents into Turkey 
(often cheaply by coach) or with no documents at all. 
Just under two thirds of Syrians were able to cross the 
border of their country into Turkey, or from Lebanon 
into Turkey either by ferry (to Mersin) or by plane 
(to Istanbul or Izmir). Similarly, most of those who 
had travelled along the Central Mediterranean route 
did so without a smuggler, and had not considered 
applying for a visa because it was not needed. For 
those travelling from West Africa for example, it was 
possible to relatively freely cross borders within the 
ECOWAS zone by hitchhiking, walking and taking the 
bus until they reached Libya, Morocco or Algeria. 
 When I left I bought a ticket from Accra 
 [Ghana] to Agadez [Niger] from the 
Rainbow Company. It cost 300,000 cefa for the 
ticket to Agadez. From Ghana to Togo took one 
day, then there was a connection to Benin for one 
day and another connection in Benin to Niger. The 
bus to Niger took two days.”
(Ghanaian man in his 30s)
However, by the time refugees and migrants had 
reached either Libya or Turkey, regardless of where 
they came from, they sought out the services of a 
smuggler to make the sea crossing into Greece or 
Italy (or Malta). Respondents engaged a smuggler 
in part because it would be very difficult to make the 
crossing independently; this would require expert 
knowledge as to where to depart from without attracting 
the attention of the Libyan or Turkish coastguard and 
military, which direction to navigate in, as well as the 
material logistics of purchasing a boat, GPS and, 
occasionally, lifejackets. Respondents were aware 
of the risks, believing that engaging with a smuggler 
increased the likelihood of arriving at their destination 
safely, or in the case of Libya being able to leave safely. 
It should be reiterated that the absence of opportunities 
to migrate safely and legally across borders is a 
significant factor driving the use of smugglers to 
facilitate the journey. One in ten of our respondents who 
travelled the Eastern Mediterranean route told us that 
before leaving home they had tried but failed to identify 
an alternative way to migrate legally through applying 
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for a visa, a UN resettlement programme or family 
reunification. More had considered applying for a visa 
but decided an attempt would likely be unsuccessful, 
or would be impossible. At the time the research 
was conducted there were no functioning embassies 
or consulates in Syria or Yemen from which these 
respondents could seek a visa in order to travel legally to 
a place of safety; respondents would have had to travel 
to Amman or Beirut, largely impossible due to border 
closures by the Jordan and Lebanese governments60.
 I didn’t try to apply for visa. There are no 
 embassies in Raqqa, and we were not 
allowed to go to the areas controlled by the 
regime. Also, women were not allowed outside 
their house. And I was avoiding exiting the 
house because I was scared. In Turkey they 
told me that it was hard to get a visa from the 
embassies there.”
(Syrian Kurdish man, travelling with his wife, two 
children aged 6 and 8 and his mother)
 I didn’t try to apply for visa. Nobody gets a 
 visa. I wish we could pay the embassy 
instead of the smuggler in order to come here.”
(Syrian man aged 20) 
Respondents from other countries – those who 
entered Europe via the Central as well as the 
Eastern Mediterranean route – are routinely refused 
visas by the governments of countries to which 
they apply, or are unable to apply for a visa due to 
high costs and/or a lack of social connections. 
 We never thought about asking for a 
 visa because it was impossible. We had 
to have thousands of Euros deposited in a bank. 
They only give them to children of the rich, rolling 
in money. Or to someone who was invited to 
Europe by a family member who guarantees 
you. If you’re nobody’s child you don’t have a 
chance. Even an appointment with the agency 
which in turn can get you an appointment with the 
consulate costs more than 200 euros, which is 400 
dinars, or a good salary.”
(Tunisian woman aged 23) 
Finding a ‘good’ smuggler
In addition to challenging assumptions about why 
refugees and migrants might need to engage the 
services of a smuggler, the findings of our research 
also bring into question the idea that all smugglers are 
part of vast criminal networks. This idea dominates 
much of current political discussion and policy analysis. 
Instead our research has found that many smugglers 
are embedded within migrant social networks and that 
there are significant differences between them, both in 
terms of the different types of functions they provide, as 
well as the degree to which they exploit their ‘clients’61. 
By far the majority of people across both the Central 
and Eastern Mediterranean routes located smugglers 
through friends, family members and extended social 
60   In the UK, for example, the refusal rate for Syrians stood at 58% in 2015 compared with 32% before the conflict began. Home Office figures show that in 2010 the 
Government received 8,028 visa requests from Syrian passport-holders to come to the UK, of which 5,522 were granted. But last year, despite receiving 7,737 visa requests 
from Syrians, the number of applications granted dropped to just 3,283 See https://www.freemovement.org.uk/refusal-rate-for-syrian-visa-applications-increases-yet-further/ 
61  See for example Kyle, D. and Koslowski, R. (eds) Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives (Second Edition), Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.
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networks, either at home or en route62. Notably this 
was the case for more than half of those interviewed in 
Greece, two of whom even admitted even working for 
smugglers as intermediaries in order to secure free travel 
or to earn money in order to pay for their trip across 
the Mediterranean. Respondents were aware that they 
were placing their lives – and sometimes those of their 
children – in the hands of their smuggler and that their 
survival depended in part on finding a ‘good’ smuggler, 
most commonly defined as one who was able to get 
them to their intended destination safely. Conversely 
the risks were heightened for those who did not know 
their smugglers and who were not connected to their 
communities63. Respondents therefore placed particular 
value on recommendations for smugglers from those 
within their social networks who had successfully – and 
safely – reached Europe. With limited available information 
about smugglers, these recommendations acted as a 
proxy for trustworthiness. Contrary to suggestions in 
the media that refugees and migrants predominantly 
located smugglers via Facebook or WhatsApp, just 
five of those interviewed in Greece told us that this is 
how they located a smuggler, and none on the Central 
Mediterranean route. The trustworthiness of information 
therefore appears to be as important as its availability. 
 I already saved the phone numbers of 
 three smugglers in Izmir since I was in 
Syria. I had found them through friends and 
relatives who had already done the journey earlier. 
It’s easy to find them from mouth to mouth.”
(Syrian man travelling with his wife and two children)
 If you want to travel [across the sea] you 
 call a friend who has been before and they 
say who to go to. I made the journey with Africans, 
Mali, Niger. Libyans they organised the camp and 
the journey.”
(Ghanaian man aged 37)
Those who were not able to find a personal 
recommendation for a ‘trusted’ smuggler instead 
sought them out in the various cities through 
which they passed (see Section 2). Respondents 
predominantly engaged with smugglers who 
came from the same ethnicity and / or nationality. 
For instance, Syrian Kurds found smugglers in 
Turkey from within the Syrian or Turkish Kurdish 
community, Afghans approached other Afghans in 
the Zeytinburnu neighbourhood of Istanbul, Iraqis 
found smugglers from amongst the Iraqi community 
in the Aksaray neighbourhood of Istanbul. 
Smugglers were easy to find in these places, in 
cafes and restaurants, internet cafes, at the airport, 
public squares, restaurants or even entering hotels 
or arriving coaches to generate new business. 
On arrival in a city, and faced with large numbers 
of smugglers selling journeys, interviewees often 
asked for advice as to their trustworthiness from 
acquaintances they knew already or had met en 
route. For example, all except one of the Eritreans 
interviewed in Greece organised their journeys 
through their first smuggler whom they had met 
in Khartoum, often being met by a collaborator in 
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62   Terms used by our respondents to refer to smugglers included ‘pushers’ or ‘connection men’, ‘dellalo’ (Eritreans in Tigrinya), ‘Semseherti’ (in Arabic), or a ‘boga’ (in 
Nigeria). Regardless of the term and the services provided, our respondents, where they referred to the gender of their smuggler(s) overwhelmingly referred to men.
63  See also Sanchez, G. (2014) Human Smuggling and Border Crossings. Oxon: Routledge
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Istanbul who arranged the onward journey to Izmir 
and Greece. On the Central Mediterranean route 
these people were described as ‘connection men’.
 I paid 130 cefa for the journey to Sabha 
 and from Sabha to Tripoli was 700 dinars 
… when I arrived in Agadez I met the connection 
man at the bus station, then stayed in the bus 
station … there is always a connection man in 
the station asking who wants to go to Libya.”
(Ghanaian man in his 30s)
 I took a coach right away and went to Izmir, 
 16 hour journey. I got off the coach. 
There were smugglers even in front of the coach 
when we got off. This is where I started meeting 
smugglers.”
(Syrian man aged 19)
Many others were also involved in facilitating our 
respondents’ journeys. Those who had travelled 
through Istanbul and Izmir referred to the shops and 
offices in which they left their fees for smugglers, 
and to the shops which sold them lifejackets64. Even 
more broadly, transportation companies profited from 
transporting refugees and migrants from Istanbul 
to the coast, and hotels and restaurants profited 
openly from hosting and taking money from those 
planning to cross the Aegean65. Afghans who got lost 
in the Iranian mountains referred to shepherds who 
guided them to safety for a fee. Along the Central 
Mediterranean route, truck owners, employers, home-
owners and even sheep farmers in Agadez transported 
and hosted irregular migrants along the way. 
Our respondents also reported paying (or smugglers 
paying on their behalf) State officials, the military, 
law enforcement, and border guards in order 
to facilitate their journeys66. This was especially 
apparent in Libya where, as we have already noted, 
it was often unclear to our respondents who was 
precisely involved in organising smuggling, from 
militia men to the police and members of the Libyan 
army. Several respondents interviewed in Italy told 
us that members of the Libyan army imprisoned 
people and released them to the smugglers for a fee. 
A few respondents interviewed in Greece told us that 
the police had taken bribes from the drivers of the 
coaches which take people from Istanbul to the coast. 
 I made five failed attempts to cross to 
 Greece. I succeeded in my sixth one. We 
were arrested at the beach four times. I paid the 
police four times, 25 dollars each time, in order 
not to take me to the camp. The fifth time we 
were arrested on our way to the coast, and we 
were sent back to Istanbul. I wasn’t detained in 
a camp. My sixth attempt was two days ago. My 
group left Istanbul by vans, taxis and cars. We 
headed to Izmir, 10 hour long journey. The police 
stopped us three times. The driver bribed them 
all three times.”
(Syrian man travelling with 15 year old brother) 
64   Respondents commonly paid US$50 commission to these small businesses and received a password, which they could call and give on arrival in Greece. This would 
then release the money to the smugglers.
65  See Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and Nyberg-Sorensen, N. (eds) (2013) The Migration Industry and the Commercialisation of International Migration, Routledge
66  For example, in Libya, there had been earlier allegations that Gadaffi had been involved into coercing people into travelling.
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Smugglers, violence and trafficking 
According to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Supress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women 
and children, ‘trafficking in persons’ is defined as 
“the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring 
or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or 
use of force or other forms of coercion (including 
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of the power or of 
a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving 
of payments or benefits) to achieve the consent of 
a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation”67. Exploitation includes, at a 
minimum, sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the 
removal of organs. Trafficking therefore differs from 
smuggling (on paper at least) in terms of the purpose 
of the facilitation: it involves not just the facilitation 
of the journey but also some kind of servitude or 
debt bondage. Our research explores this further.
We found that along the Eastern Mediterranean route, 
far from being coerced into paying their smugglers, 
respondents who travelled to Greece often knew 
well in advance how much they would have to pay for 
the different services offered by smugglers. Several 
reported bargaining with smugglers over the prices 
according to the size and type of the boat used to cross 
the Mediterranean, how many people would be on the 
boat, whether it would be daytime or night-time at the 
time of embarkation, and which nationalities would 
travel. Two Syrians even claimed their money back from 
smugglers after an unsuccessful attempt at crossing 
the Aegean. Respondents commonly paid the money 
upon her/ his safe arrival at the intended destination.
 I spent 10 days in Izmir. I was gathering 
 information. I was sleeping in the squares.  
I couldn’t afford a hotel room. At some point I 
heard that the boat driver travels for free. I knew 
straight away that this was my chance.  
I had heard that the Iraqi smugglers charge  
US$1,200 – US$1,300 per person and that the 
Syrians charge US$1,000 – US$1,100 per person. 
I met a smuggler in Basmane and told him that I 
know how to drive a boat and we made a deal like 
that, free of charge.”
(Syrian man travelling alone) 
 
This did not mean that respondents who travelled 
through Turkey to Greece did not experience 
violence or abuse perpetrated by the smugglers 
on their journey, but this violence and abuse does 
not by, in and of itself, constitute trafficking.
Whilst a small number of respondents took care 
to mention that their smugglers had been kind to 
them, interviewees mostly regarded smugglers 
as a necessity – and sometimes a violent and 
unpleasant one at that. It is important to also 
note that smugglers were not always the most 
frequently referred to perpetrators of violence 
en route with violence at the hands of State 
officials and ‘bandits’ more frequently referred 
to. Afghans referred to the violence of smugglers 
whilst crossing the mountains in between Iran 
and Turkey, and before travelling onto Ankara or 
Istanbul. Smugglers reportedly beat those who 
struggled to keep up, or who made noise which 
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67  See https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/legislation-and-case-law-international-legislation-united-nations/united-nations-protocol-prevent_en  
57
threatened to bring them to the attention of Iranian 
solders. Most commonly respondents referred to 
bad experiences in which they had been, in effect, 
held prisoner in houses on arrival in Van (Turkey) 
or surrounding small villages, such as Dogubayazit. 
This was usually until the money had been released 
to the smuggler back in Iran and meant that Afghan 
respondents were often held for several days. 
 In Dogubayazit the smugglers were 
 guarding us with guns. They were afraid 
that we will leave. In this border, smugglers also 
kidnap Afghans and call their families and ask  
for ransom.”
(Afghan Hazara man travelling with three young 
cousins) 
Respondents also commonly reported violence 
from the smugglers who took them to the beaches 
in Turkey. The violence took the form of pushing 
people onto boats if they were scared or showed 
unwillingness to board and beating people to 
inflate boats, or to board, more quickly. Violence 
is also employed as a strategy by smugglers for 
managing the chaos of numbers on the beaches. 
 The smuggler wanted to put in the boat 
 more than 50 people. I told the smugglers 
that we are planning to travel like that. They tried 
to beat me. They had knives. They threatened to 
kill me. So eventually we agreed for 41 people in 
the boat plus 12 children.”
(Syrian man travelling with wife and child)
© Alessandro Penso / MSF
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Along the Central Mediterranean route, respondents 
reported similar types of violence being perpetrated 
by smugglers. This was especially evident among 
those who engaged smugglers to organise their 
onward travel from Agadez into Libya, and those 
who facilitated travel out of Libya to Italy. 
 One day armed men came to the building 
 and kidnapped him, “they pushed and 
told us to go with them or they would shoot us … 
they put me on a boat, I did not want to but they 
pushed me on the boat.” 
(Malian man in his 30s, travelling alone) 
It is important to note that whilst we found far more 
examples of our respondents being smuggled than 
trafficked (according to the Convention definitions), 
in Libya in particular the dividing lines between those 
who are ‘smugglers’, ‘traffickers’, State officials, 
militias, employers and local residents, were not clear 
to our respondents. Some smugglers provided safe 
passage; others were exploitative and violent en 
route68. However some of the experiences described by 
respondents travelling along the Central Mediterranean 
route fell more clearly into the category of human 
trafficking. For instance, some of our respondents 
were forced to work in Libya by their smugglers for 
no pay or were even sold on to others. The former 
constitutes trafficking for forced labour, and in this 
case the individuals involved could be defined 
as ‘traffickers’69. This is perhaps unsurprising as 
forced labour conditions are endemic in Libya, and 
smuggling is clearly rooted in providing a cheap or 
even free labour force for employers in the country70.
 I had my aunt send me the money and I 
 paid a Sudanese trafficker. There were 50 
of us in a jeep who crossed the desert and we got 
to Sabha. Then they arrested us and took us to a 
prison where we spent two weeks. We were sold 
as slaves to a Libyan man who brought us to work 
in a marble quarry. I drove a forklift to move the 
stones. They did not pay us. I worked there two 
months. We revolted and were beaten.” 
(Malian man aged 21) 
Along the Central Mediterranean route, there were 
also fewer incidences of bargaining over fees paid 
to smugglers than we heard about on the Eastern 
Mediterranean route. Many of our interviewees all the way 
along the different routes to Greece, paid their money 
to smugglers on arrival at their destination (whether 
in Greece or at stops en route), which provided an 
incentive to smugglers to get them to their destination, at 
least alive. Few who travelled to Europe via the Central 
Mediterranean route had that option. Only Eritreans 
who departed from Khartoum to Italy paid (partly) on 
arrival71. For those from West Africa, the journey across 
the desert and the sea was usually paid upfront. 
Finally, we identified what were regarded by stakeholders 
as very clear examples of trafficking involving Nigerian 
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68  See also Koser, K. (2008) ‘Why migrant smuggling pays’, International Migration 46(2), 3-26 
69  See International Labour Organisation (ILO) at http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/publications/WCMS_203832/lang--en/index.htm 
70  See, for example, http://igad.int/attachments/1284_ISSP%20Sahan%20HST%20Report%20%2018ii2016%20FINAL%20FINAL.pdf 
71  This meant that there was a pre-agreed price, although this could become more expensive if a ransom was needed to be paid to be freed from prison or a kidnapping situation. 
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women who had been brought to Italy to work in 
the sex industry. It is clear that these women had 
experienced violence and sexual exploitation, but it is 
less clear whether they had been ‘trafficked’ or were 
using sex work as part of their migration ‘strategy’. 
Whilst male refugees and migrants were able to 
work – even if in terrible conditions – on construction 
sites, in car-washing  and in agriculture in order to 
earn enough to pay a smuggler to leave Libya, for 
many women the only possibility was to pay for their 
journey with their bodies. For instance, one woman 
living and working in Tripoli had wanted to leave when 
the conflict worsened and therefore approached 
someone she believed to be a smuggler. The man kept 
her in a room for several weeks in order to that she 
could ‘pay’ for her journey. In other words, the level 
of consent was not always clear. Our respondents 
were clearly deeply affected by their experiences.
Payments to smugglers 
Along the Eastern Mediterranean route, the total amounts paid by respondents to smugglers from the 
country of origin to Greece were highest for Eritreans, with costs potentially as much as US$13,500. 
Other nationalities reported paying lower but nonetheless substantial amounts with Afghans paying 
smugglers up to a total of US$4,000 to travel from Afghanistan to Greece. Payments were made at 
the different legs of the journey. Prices increased according to how much the bribes which needed to 
be paid to border guards or to militias were. The prices of smuggling services to Greece from Turkey 
were relatively consistent across all nationalities, with only the Eritreans paying significantly more (a 
mode of US$1,500 compared with a mode of US$1,000 for the other nationalities). Along the Central 
Mediterranean route, the prices paid to smugglers varied significantly. In Libya some people said that they 
did not pay for their journey across the Mediterranean because they had managed to board a boat without 
paying or claimed that someone else had paid on their behalf, or because they had no money but all of 
their belongings were taken off them prior to boarding, or because they had been in (forced) labour with 
someone who then took them to the boat and organised their journey. Overall, the fees paid to smugglers 
were significantly more than if our respondents had travelled through a regular route with a passport and 
visa, and had been able to take buses, planes or other form of regular transportation along the way. 
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Section 5
Implications for EU migration policy  
Key points
The failure of EU policies to respond effectively to the increased movement of people across the Mediterranean 
in 2015 is due in part to flawed assumptions about the reasons why people move, the factors that 
shape their longer-term migration trajectories and their journeys to Europe. These assumptions 
became deeply politicised over the course of 2015.
There is a need for nuanced, tailored and targeted policy responses which reflect the diverse, stratified and 
increasingly protracted and fragmented movements of people. We identify five key challenges for policymakers.
ADDRESSING THE DRIVERS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY MIGRATION
Although there is growing awareness of the need to pay attention to the drivers of forced migration, 
including the need for co-ordination in the fields of foreign policy, development and trade, the focus at the  
EU level remains very firmly on border controls and on measures to deter people from moving to Europe. 
PROVIDING ACCESS TO PROTECTION
There is a complex relationship between forced and economic drivers of migration to Europe. Everyone has a right to seek 
asylum. This means providing access to protection and recognising that people’s reasons for leaving their counties of 
origin and travelling to Europe are complex. Protection needs cannot be determined by nationality alone. 
REDUCING THE DEMAND FOR SMUGGLERS
The closure of borders has increased the demand for, and use of, smugglers who have become the only 
option for those unable to leave their countries or enter countries in which protection might potentially be available 
to them. It has also led to a significant increase in deaths as people attempt to cross the Mediterranean.  
The number of people dying on the crossing to Greece has more than doubled in 2016.
There is an urgent need to significantly expand safe and legal routes for protection. 
IMPROVING RECEPTION AND INTEGRATION
The EU has focused almost exclusively on policies designed to contain refugees and migrants prior to their arrival 
on European shores, at the expense of addressing the reception and protection needs of those arriving from 
situations of conflict, persecution and human rights abuse. There has also been a failure at the national and 
EU levels to address the longer-term integration needs of refugees and migrants arriving in Europe.
MOVING BEYOND THE POLITICS OF CONTAINMENT
During the course of 2015 the EU has intensified pressure on other countries to stem the flow and assume 
responsibility for refugees and migrants from neighbouring countries so they do not travel onward to Europe. 
This includes an agreement with Turkey and increasing efforts to reach similar agreements with governments in 
Libya, Sudan, Niger, Eritrea and others.  
Policy makers need to engage with the issue of development as an important policy objective in its own 
right rather than primarily as a mechanism for preventing migration to Europe. And they need to be 
aware that the politics of containment – reflected in interdiction, interception and off-shore processing – have 
‘ripple effects’ which undermine the principles of international protection globally.
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We began this report by suggesting that the 
Mediterranean ‘migration crisis’ of 2015 was presented 
by politicians, policy makers and the media as a single 
coherent flow that came from ‘from nowhere’ and was 
primarily the result of a sudden and unexpected increase 
in people pressing against the continent’s southern 
border. But the arrival of large numbers of refugees and 
migrants was neither new nor unexpected. Arrivals in Italy 
were actually higher in 2014 than in 2015 and the arrival 
of nearly 850,000 people in Greece can be attributed 
in significant part to escalating conflicts in Syria, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, which have displaced millions of 
people over the past six years. The humanitarian crisis 
that unfolded on the borders of the European Union – 
and is now increasingly unfolding inside it – was not the 
result of a natural or unforeseen disaster. Rather it was, 
in large part, a policy driven crisis sustained by the failure 
of the EU to put in place adequate and humane policies 
to deal with this unprecedented but also foreseeable 
movement of people72.
The failure of EU policies to respond effectively to the 
increased movement of people across the Mediterranean 
in 2015 was, in no small part, a problem of political 
differences and tensions within and between EU Member 
States73. But EU policy failures also reflect flawed 
assumptions about the reasons why people move, the 
factors that shape their longer-term migration trajectories 
and their journeys to Europe. These assumptions became 
deeply politicised over the course of 2015, employed by a 
series of different actors to justify, legitimate and reinforce 
policies which, whilst largely ineffective in addressing the 
issues that had led to the increased arrival of refugees and 
migrants, were intended to reassure the public that the 
situation was ‘under control’.
The EU policy context shifted constantly during 2015 
whilst this research was being undertaken and has 
changed dramatically in the months since the fieldwork 
was completed. Faced with a growing number of people 
seeking protection in Europe, EU institutions adopted 
a number of plans and policies. These included a 
new European Agenda on Migration, putting forward 
immediate responses and longer-term policy changes for 
the so-called emergency situation’ at its borders74, two 
implementation packages (May and September 2015) 
and numerous Ministerial meetings and emergency 
summits aimed at adopting some of the agenda items on 
migration and other key measures.
In addition there have been a number of diplomatic 
initiatives involving EU Member States and other 
countries. The first was the Valletta Conference on 
Migration held in November 2015 which aimed was 
primarily at addressing the ‘root causes’ of migration 
in departure countries, tackling the smuggling and 
trafficking of migrants and increasing cooperation on 
return and readmission. The second, and perhaps more 
well-documented initiative, was the EU-Turkey Joint 
Action Plan75. In exchange for a European commitment 
72   See also MSF (2016) Obstacle Course to Europe: A Policy-Made Humanitarian Crisis at EU Borders, https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/sites/usa/
files/2016_01_msf_obstacle_course_to_europe_-_final_-_low_res.pdf 
73   Crawley, H. (2016) ‘Crisis or opportunity? How European countries use refugees for political gain’, The Conversation http://www.medmig.info/crisis-or-opportunity-how-
european-countries-use-refugees-for-political-gain/; Crawley, H. (2016) ‘Managing the unmanageable? Understanding Europe’s response to the migration ‘crisis’’, Human 
Geography 9(2), 12-23, https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=hg-252-crawley.pdf&site=2  See also Parkes, R. (2015) ‘European Union and the 
Geopolitics of Migration’ Ulpaper No.1, Swedish Institute of International Affairs http://www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/111585.pdf for a more detailed historical perspective
74   See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/index_en.htm 
75   See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_en.htm 
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to a €3 billion fund to address the humanitarian situation 
in Turkey (which was subsequently increased to €6 
billion), the possibility of visa liberalisation for Turkish 
citizens and the fast-tracking of EU membership status, 
Turkey agreed to increase its efforts to stem the flow of 
refugees and migrants across its territory to Europe and 
cooperate on the re-admission of irregular migrants. 
While some new and positive measures have been put 
forward by the EU and its Member States, the EU’s 
response to date has been largely insufficient and 
driven by a border-control agenda. This has significantly 
reduced the number of people arriving in Europe but it 
has done nothing to address the causes of migration to 
Europe, or the protection and integration needs of those 
who are already here and who continue to arrive through 
the Central Mediterranean route. 
With the attention of Greek and EU leaders focused 
firmly on the implementation of the recently agreed EU-
Turkey deal, the plight of more than 60,000 left stranded 
in Greece in overcrowded and poor conditions, and with 
little prospect of accessing international protection or 
family reunification, is in danger of being forgotten76. A 
year into the ‘crisis’, both the reception infrastructure and 
the asylum system in Greece continue to fail to adapt to 
the needs of the refugees and migrants77. This is partly a 
Greek failure but it is also a failure of the EU. The refugee 
relocation scheme from Greece, explicitly described as 
an act of European solidarity and responsibility sharing 
by the European Commission78, has relocated just 4,814 
(7.25%) of the 66,400 people originally agreed79. 
Meanwhile the drivers of migration to Europe are not 
going away. At the time of writing, Syria remains mired 
in conflict, with French President Francois Hollande 
describing Syrian and Russian bombing of rebel-held 
areas of Aleppo as a war crime80. The situation in Yemen, 
with daily bombs falling from the US-led Saudi Coalition, 
has been described as ‘catastrophic’81. The assault 
on Mosul (Iraq) which began in mid-October 2016 is 
expected to displace 1.5 million people, many of whom 
are likely to cross the border into Eastern Turkey just a 
few hours away82. In Afghanistan, Kabul is seeing the 
emergence of suicide bombers once more. Ethiopia, 
recently the recipient of a US$200m concessional loan 
from the European Investment Bank to create jobs for 
its refugees83, has just declared a state of emergency84, 
Nigerian forces continue to fight Boko Haram, and 
human rights abuses persist in Eritrea. 
And while the numbers may have gone down, for the 
moment at least, the politics of the ‘crisis’ have not gone 
away but arguably have become even more potent. 
The UK referendum vote to leave the EU, Hungary’s 
referendum decision to refuse to accept refugees under 
the relocation scheme and ongoing pressures on  
Merkel to ‘close the door’ are just a few of the most 
obvious examples. 
Our research provides new empirical insights into 
the dynamics of migration into Europe. The data was 
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76   Amnesty International (2016) Trapped in Greece: An Avoidable Refugee Crisis, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur25/3778/2016/en/ 
77   MSF (2016) fn. 72
78   See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_eu_solidarity_a_refugee_relocation_system_en.pdf
79   Figures correct as at 18th October 2016 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_
relocation_en.pdf 
80   https://www.theguardian.com/world/francois-hollande 
81   https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/15/us-bombed-yemen-middle-east-conflict 
82   https://cruxnow.com/cns/2016/08/04/assault-isis-mosul-expected-displace-1-5-million/ 
83   http://www.eib.org/infocentre/press/releases/all/2016/2016-212-european-investment-bank-president-pledges-support-for-jobs-compact-in-ethiopia-tackling-migration-
and-refugee-challenge.htm 
84  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/21/1500-people-arrested-in-ethiopia-in-two-week-state-of-emergency 
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collected at a very particular moment in time when the 
movement of people across the Mediterranean was at its 
highest but it shines a light on the differences between 
routes, groups and the experiences of people on the 
move. In general, our analysis suggests that due to the 
enormous diversity of geographies, people, drivers and 
motives any broad brush approach will not be sufficient. 
There is a need for nuanced, tailored and targeted 
policy responses which reflect the diverse, stratified and 
increasingly protracted and fragmented movements of 
people. We conclude this report with a discussion of five 
key challenges for policymakers.
1.  ADDRESSING THE DRIVERS OF 
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY MIGRATION
Findings
This report has presented the findings of our research 
drawn based on the experiences and voices of the 
500 women and men we interviewed. The richness of 
this material provides new insights into the dynamics 
of migration to Europe and the ‘back stories’ that led 
individuals and families to take the decision to cross 
the Mediterranean. 
It is clear from the findings of our research that conflict in 
the countries neighbouring Europe, and beyond, was a 
major factor contributing to the significant increase in the 
number of refugees and migrants arriving in 2015. Our 
research has also identified important differences in the 
drivers of migration between the initial decision to leave 
the home country and subsequent decisions to move on 
from one or more other countries. Some of those who 
crossed the Mediterranean in 2015 had a relatively clear 
and consistent objective in mind from the point at which 
they departed their home country and their migration to 
Europe can therefore be regarded as a single journey 
with various stops or interruptions. This was particularly 
the case for the Syrians and Iraqis that participated in the 
research. But our research has also found that many of 
those who crossed the Mediterranean in 2015 had not 
travelled directly from their countries of origin but rather 
had often left months or even years beforehand. Some 
had stopped for short periods of time in order to rest, 
settle, work, obtain resources or connect with onward 
transport. Others had stayed in different countries 
outside Europe for longer periods of time in the hope of 
securing work and rebuilding a life. 
It is also clear from our research that many of those 
who leave situations of conflict find themselves in very 
difficult economic circumstances in Jordan, Lebanon, 
Turkey, Iran and elsewhere as a result of limited rights, 
exploitation by employers and discrimination in the 
labour market (and beyond). These circumstances propel 
them onwards. A third (34%) of respondents on the 
Eastern Mediterranean route had moved on for what 
might typically be understood as economic reasons: 
they were running out of money, found it impossible to 
secure employment or were working long hours for very 
little pay. With the passage of time, and in the absence 
64
of a resolution to the conflicts in their home countries, 
respondents told us that they had grown increasingly 
concerned about the impacts on their families, and 
especially their children, many of whom had been out of 
schools for many years or had health issues. The arrival 
of significant numbers of people in Greece in 2015 
therefore raises important questions about access to 
rights and the quality of living conditions for refugees 
and migrants living in countries such as Turkey, a 
significant proportion of whom decided to cross the 
Mediterranean in 2015. For those who are living in 
Libya meanwhile, violence and exploitation were key 
drivers of onward movement and are likely to remain so 
for the foreseeable future.
Implications
There are two main policy implications arising from the 
findings of our research.
Firstly, it is clear that the pressures that drive people 
to leave their homes and, ultimately, their countries 
are likely to persist. More than 12 million people were 
displaced around the world in 2015 along and the 
situation has not improved in 2016. Across the globe, 
hundreds of thousands of people continue to be 
displaced from their homes every day. Indeed some 
conflicts, most notably in Syria, Yemen and now Iraq, 
have intensified. There has been growing awareness 
within the EU of the need to pay attention to the 
drivers of forced migration, including the need for co-
ordination in the fields of foreign policy, development 
and trade, yet the focus at the EU level has been very 
firmly on border controls and on preventing people 
from travelling to Europe. Addressing the drivers of 
migration requires the involvement of a whole range of 
EU policies concerned with human rights, humanitarian 
action, foreign affairs, international co-operation, 
development assistance, trade policy and investment, 
are involved. Although there has been recognition of 
this at the level of the European Commission for some 
time, in practice such an approach to addressing has 
proved difficult to implement85.
Secondly, far greater attention need to be paid to 
conditions in the countries to which refugees and 
migrants have moved before making a decision to 
come to Europe. Increased migration to Europe in 
2015 was not only a response to increased conflict 
and human rights abuse but also the lack of sufficient 
reception conditions in the countries neighbouring the 
EU (most notably, Turkey and Libya but also further 
afield in Lebanon, Jordan and Iran). The international 
community’s response to the situation in these 
countries has been wholly inadequate. Funding for the 
Syria Regional Refugee Response is only half what is 
required and high-profile pledges of financial support by 
key donor countries have only been partially delivered86. 
Emergency programmes supporting refugees in 
recipient countries have been cut as a result. UNHCR 
estimates that 86% of Syrian refugees in Jordan and 
70% in Lebanon are living below the poverty line87.
85   Castles, S., Loughna, S. and Crawley, H. (2003) States of Conflict: The Causes of Forced Migration to the EU, London: IPPR 
86   See https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis
87   Metcalfe-Hough, V. (2016) ‘The migration crisis? Facts, challenges and possible solutions’, ODI Brief https://www.odi.org/publications/9993-migration-migrants-eu-
europe-syria-refugees-borders-asylum
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2. ACCESS TO PROTECTION
Findings
Whilst the vast majority of those arriving in Greece 
during 2015 came from countries in which there was 
well-documented conflict, violence and human rights 
abuse, it is impossible to fully appreciate the drivers of 
migration during this period without examining the ways 
in which forced and economic factors come together 
to shape the experiences of those on the move. This is 
particularly clear in the context of Syria where protracted 
conflict has undermined the ability to earn a livelihood 
and feed a family by killing primary breadwinners, 
destroying businesses and making it impossible to travel 
to work. The conflict has also devastated the economic 
infrastructure of the country, increasing the prices of 
basic goods and commodities including food and oil. 
Price increases have been exacerbated by internal 
displacement and the movement of large numbers of 
people to some of the safer cities. Many respondents 
told us that they had taken the decision to move for 
economic reasons but that it was conflict that had 
created their economic insecurity. 
In addition, some people who did not have specific 
protection claims on leaving their home country 
subsequently became in need of protection because of 
the exploitation, violence and kidnapping they suffered 
during their journeys. This is most certainly the case 
in Libya where many of our respondents spent long 
periods of time, either earning money or waiting for 
an opportunity to escape the situation in which they 
had found themselves. As one of our respondents 
put it, “there is no way back, the desert is one way.” 
For him and others the dangerous journey across 
the Mediterranean was seen as being safer than the 
alternatives. 
Implications
The international community as a whole has a role to 
play in addressing global migration challenges and 
refugee crises, including the crisis currently affecting the 
EU. However, the EU, its institutions, and its Member 
States have specific legal obligations to individuals on its 
territory and at its land and sea borders. EU governments 
are legally obligated to treat all of those who arrive in 
accordance with international law, including with regard 
to the right to seek asylum. This right is enshrined in the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and given practical 
effect in various EU laws and regulations. This obligation 
trumps other responsibilities including those related to 
the security of external borders. 
In this context the policy implications of our research are 
two-fold.
Firstly, in the most immediate and practical terms, 
providing access to protection for refugees and migrants 
arriving in Europe through irregular channels means 
ensuring that EU search and rescue operations at 
sea are robust and cover the widest geographic area 
possible; ensuring that reception facilities are adequate 
for the volume and diversity of arrivals; and ensuring swift 
and fair processing of asylum claims and appropriate 
action once status has been determined.
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Secondly, it means recognising that far from being 
straight forward, people’s reasons for leaving their 
counties of origin and travelling to Europe are often 
multifaceted and cannot be determined by nationality 
alone. The complex nature of contemporary global 
migration patterns and drivers is presenting huge 
challenges to existing international, regional and national 
legal and policy frameworks88. People’s individual stories, 
their vulnerabilities and possible persecution cannot be 
understood without a proper assessment of their unique 
situation89. Notwithstanding specific legal protections 
for refugees, the current use of simplistic categories of 
‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ migration creates a two-tiered 
system of protection and assistance in which the rights 
and needs of those not qualifying as ‘refugees’ under the 
legal definition are effectively disregarded90.
3.  REDUCING THE DEMAND FOR 
SMUGGLERS
The overall direction of EU policy in relation to smuggling 
has been through the lens of ‘criminal activities’ and 
‘smuggling business models’91. In April 2015, the EU 
Commissioner for Migration Dimitris Avramopoulos 
announced that Europe was ‘at war’ with smugglers and 
signalled the start of a new concerted effort on the part 
of the EU to ‘break the smugglers business model’92. This 
was quickly followed by a renewed focus on tightening 
border controls through the use of FRONTEX patrols 
in the Mediterranean, the closure of borders and the 
construction of fences to prevent the irregular onward 
migration of those who enter Europe. Almost one year 
later EU Council President Tusk claimed that sending 
what he described as ‘illegal refugees and migrants’ 
back from Europe would similarly ‘break the smugglers 
business model’93. 
In practice both of these assertions have proven wrong. 
The evidence from our research suggests that smuggling 
is driven, rather than broken, by EU policy. Increased 
border controls may have reduced the number of people 
arriving by sea, on the Eastern Mediterranean route 
at least, but they have also resulted in an increase in 
clandestine efforts to reach Europe, in turn exposing 
vulnerable migrants to even greater physical and other 
risks94. There are a number of reasons why.
Firstly, the closure of borders seems likely to have 
significantly increased the demand for, and use of, 
smugglers who have become the only option for those 
unable to leave their countries or enter countries in which 
protection might potentially be available to them. All of 
our respondents engaged the services of a smuggler 
for at least one stage of their journey to Greece or 
Italy. Smugglers performed two main functions for our 
respondents: they helped respondents escape danger, 
conflict or persecution at home or en route and they 
enabled them to bypass controlled borders where 
these were a barrier to reaching safety, protection and 
88   Zetter, R. (2015) Protection in Crisis: Forced Migration and Protection in a Global Era. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
research/protection-crisis-forced-migration-and-protection-global-era 
89   MSF (2016), fn.72
90   Metcalfe-Hough, V. (2016) fn.87
91   https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/experts-meet-europol-tackle-migrant-smuggling-organised-crime-through-financial-investigatio See also, UNODC 2011; 2016, Europol 2016. 
92   See http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2015-04-23/local-news/Europe-is-already-at-war-against-smugglers-Commissioner-for-Migration-Dimitris-Avramopoulos-6736134333 
93   See http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/refugee-crisis-donald-tusk-urges-breaking-smugglers-business-model-1547619 
94   Cosgrave, J., Hargrave, H., Foresti, M. and Massa, I (2016) Europe’s Refugees and Migrants: Hidden Flows, Tightened Borders and Spiralling Costs, ODI Report 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10887.pdf 
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livelihoods. For everyone we spoke to smugglers were a 
necessity. One in ten of our respondents who travelled to 
Greece via the Eastern Mediterranean route told us that 
before leaving home they had tried but failed to identify an 
alternative way to migrate legally, through applying for a 
visa, a UN resettlement programme or family reunification. 
Secondly, the closure of borders during 2015 meant 
that became increasingly dangerous to cross the 
Mediterranean95. Smugglers responded to increased 
controls by looking for alternative routes or sent boats on to 
the water at night when they were less likely to be detected, 
and also to be rescued. In a previous Research Brief we 
reported on the increased death rates seen in the Central 
and Eastern Mediterranean routes over the course of 2014 
and 201596. Although the vast majority of the arrivals to 
Europe by sea during 2015 were through the Eastern 
Mediterranean to Greece, by far the greatest number of 
deaths was recorded in the Central Mediterranean.  
Whilst one person crossing to Greece died for every 1,049 
people who safely arrived, the corresponding rate on the 
Central Mediterranean route there was one death for every 
53 arrivals. According to IOM, 3,930 people were dead or 
missing as of 27th October 2016, a figure which is higher 
than the total for 2015. The rates of death had increased 
to 1 in 46 people among those crossing via the Central 
Mediterranean route and arriving safely and to 1 death in 
every 409 arrivals via the Eastern Mediterranean route. 
In other words the death rate for the short distance from 
Turkey to Greece has more than doubled97.
Implications
The main policy implication of our findings is the need to 
significantly increase access to safe and legal routes for 
protection. This includes significantly expanding current 
resettlement programmes, increasing humanitarian visas 
or establishing temporary international protection for 
those with a prima facie case for refugee status and 
increasing opportunities for family reunification. This 
would reduce the need for refugees and migrants to 
resort to dangerous irregular channels. The way to reduce 
the use of smugglers is not to close more borders or 
build more fences but by creating alternative entry routes 
and addressing the drivers of irregular migration98.
Many of the EU policies that have been debated during 
2015 and 2016 acknowledge the need to open up safe 
and legal routes for protection but to date have met with 
limited success99. 
The main policy priority should be in relation to 
resettlement. UNHCR has estimated that in 2015, 
globally, 960,000 people were in need of resettlement, 
including 316,000 in the Middle East and 279,000 in 
Africa. In July 2015 the EU pledged to provide places 
for 22,504 persons in clear need of international 
protection100. This pledge is not only insufficient it has 
not been delivered. As of 13th July 2016 just 8,268 
people had been resettled under the scheme, mainly 
from Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. A further 802 Syrian 
refugees had also been resettled from Turkey under 
95   Jones, R. (2016) Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move, London: Verso Books
96   McMahon, S. and Sigona, N. (2016) ‘Boat migration across the Central Mediterranean: drivers, experiences and responses’, MEDMIG Research Brief No.3 http://www.
medmig.info/research-brief-03-Boat-migration-across-the-Central-Mediterranean.pdf 
97   157,049 had safely crossed via the Central Mediterranean route but 3,435 were recorded as dead or missing. A total of 169,524 had crossed via the Eastern 
Mediterranean route with 415 dead or missing. Data available from IOM’s Missing Migrants Project, http://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean-update-28-
october-2016 (figures correct as of 28th October 2016)
98   OECD (2015) ‘Can we put an end to human smuggling?’, Migration Policy Debates No. 9 (December), www.oecd.org/migration
99   In May 2015 the European Commission presented a comprehensive European Agenda on Migration which recognised the need to avoid those fleeing conflict and in 
need of protection having to resort to smugglers. See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation- 
100   Figures correct as of 13th July 2016. See European Commission (2016) Fifth Report on Relocation and Resettlement available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/
what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160713/fifth_report_on_relocation_and_resettlement_en.pdf  
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the EU-Turkey agreement101 and 2,682 had been 
resettled to the UK under the Syrian Vulnerable Persons 
Relocation scheme102. Whilst the European Commission 
is committed, in principle, to significantly increasing the 
scale of resettlement through establishing a common 
EU Resettlement Framework103, the extent to which this 
policy objective can be delivered in the current political 
context is questionable. 
In addition to resettlement, the OECD has identified 
what it describes as a number of ‘alternative pathways’ 
for refugees and migrants104. ‘Alternative pathways’ 
are migration channels not necessarily designed for 
refugees, but which can be used by refugees, in order to 
avoid using costly and often dangerous routes through 
the asylum channels. They can also be used by other 
migrants. These pathways include labour, international 
study and family migration, as well as humanitarian visas.
As was noted in our earlier Research Brief on 
the Eastern Mediterranean route, the presence of 
family members or other social contacts (friends, 
acquaintances) was the most important factor for nearly 
two thirds (59%) of those who mentioned that they 
had an intended destination in Europe105. Whilst there 
are issues with some of the ways in which cases for 
family reunification as it currently operates (including, 
for example, the narrow definition of ‘a family’ and the 
fact that an application cannot be made until an asylum 
seeker is recognised as a refugee), family reunification 
provides a relatively straightforward mechanism for 
creating opportunities for families to be reunited  
without risking the dangerous and costly journey  
across the Mediterranean. 
Humanitarian visas are also an underutilized tool for 
helping eligible individuals reach the EU without risking 
their lives or resorting to smugglers. These limited-
term visas can be issued in embassies and consulates 
to individuals seeking to apply for asylum and to 
other individuals on humanitarian grounds. Issued in 
conjunction with visas for educational and employment 
opportunities, they could considerably increase the 
possibilities for refugees and migrants to enter the EU 
on a temporary basis at least. The EU needs to think 
more creatively about how to facilitate migration for the 
purpose of work through regular channels including 
through the creation of temporary work permits.
The provision of more safe and legal channels in order 
that refugees and migrants can reach the EU without 
having to risk their lives or resort to smugglers could 
reduce the scale of death in the Mediterranean. The 
development of such channels need not amount to an 
open door policy: those arriving can be screened, have 
their protection needs assessed, and their entitlement 
to remain in the European Union determined based on 
their international protection needs and any human rights 
imperatives. Those found, after a fair procedure, not to 
have such a basis to remain could be removed106. 
101   The EU-Turkey Statement of 18th March 2016 provides that for every Syrian being returned from Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from 
Turkey to the EU. Priority is given to refugees who have not previously entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly.
102   2,682 people were granted humanitarian protection under the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme in the year end June 2016 (2,898 since 
the scheme began in January 2014). See https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/
migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/august2016
103   See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2434_en.htm 
104   OECD (2016) ‘Are there alternative pathways for refugees?’, Migration Policy Debates No. 12 (September), www.oecd.org/migration 
105   Crawley, H., Duvell, F., Jones, K. and Skleparis, D. (2016) ‘Understanding the dynamics of migration to Greece and the EU: drivers, decisions and destinations’, 
MEDMIG Research Brief No.2 http://www.medmig.info/research-brief-02-Understanding-the-dynamics-of-migration-to-Greece-and-the-EU.pdf 
106   See also Human Rights Watch (2015) Europe’s Refugee Crisis: An Agenda for Action, https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/11/16/europes-refugee-crisis/agenda-action 
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4.  DELIVERING RECEPTION AND 
INTEGRATION
Findings
Despite attempts by the EU at harmonising policies 
towards the arrival of increasing boat migration across 
the Mediterranean during the course of 2015, the policies 
of Italy and Greece were shaped by their respective 
national contexts and the politics of migration. In Italy, 
two factors formed a back-drop to the response. Firstly, 
a technocratic (and unelected) political leadership led 
by centre-left PM Enrico Letta infused a Catholic ethos 
ethos had replaced Silvio Berlusconi’s long standing right-
wing government and its fervent anti-migration rhetoric. 
Secondly, the election of Pope Francis earlier in 2013 
and his strong pro-immigration message which was first 
officially delivered in a visit to Lampedusa in July 2013107.
 
Meanwhile at the same time as the number of refugees and 
migrants entering Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean 
route started to dramatically increase, Greece experienced 
the worst and longest economic crisis in its modern history. 
Austerity measures initiated as a result of the EU’s bail 
out and the stringent terms imposed by the EU troika had 
unleashed widespread social unrest and political instability108. 
There was a rapid and significant increase in outward 
migration with over half a million Greek citizens leaving the 
country since 2008, forming a so-called 3rd emigration 
wave of Greeks. In the same year more than 100,000 
Italians also emigrated in response to economic difficulties.
The very different political and economic contexts in Italy 
and Greece contributed significantly to the way in which 
each country dealt with the ‘crisis’ as it unfolded.
In Italy, the unification of the maritime governance of the 
Central Mediterranean route which pooled resources 
and meant that all of the refugees and migrants rescued 
at sea were taken to Italy for processing, contributed 
to what can be considered a ‘normalisation of the 
emergency’, at least as far as the arrival and primary 
reception stage was concerned. A more managed 
approach to disembarkation and the distribution of sea 
arrivals across Italy (rather than almost exclusively in 
Lampedusa and Sicily as had previously been the case) 
moderated the narrative of invasion which had dominated 
political and media discourse until that point. However, 
after a year of Mare Nostrum (October 2013 – 2014), 
the policy objective of stopping migration flows regained 
primacy in the political debate with the newly appointed 
PM Matteo Renzi calling for closer involvement of the EU 
in what he repeatedly depicted as a ‘European problem’109.
From a practical point of view, the normalisation of the 
emergency meant that a refugee reception system could 
be expanded. However this system is not without its 
problems. The current official reception system in Italy 
is basically two-pronged: there is an ‘ordinary’ system 
providing short-term accommodation and legal support 
followed by longer-term measures for integration for asylum 
claimants (the SPRAR system), and an ‘emergency’ one 
which provides only short-term accommodation and basic 
107   http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23224010 
108   https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/12/greece-bailout-terms-eurozone-policymaking-powers 
109   Although this was not a new depiction: in 2011 the first large scale arrivals of people on Lampedusa were also described as a problem for Europe.  
See McMahon, S. (2012) North African Migration and Europe’s Contextual Mediterranean Border in Light of the Lampedusa Migrant Crisis of 2011, Florence: 
European University Institute Working Papers
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services. In response to the Emergenza Nord Africa in 
2011 and especially following the increase in arrivals 
in 2014 and 2015, the emergency regime underwent 
an enormous and rapid expansion. While effective in 
rapidly increasing Italy’s stock of places for refugees and 
migrants, developments in 2015 led to concerns being 
raised about the uneven and often sub-standard quality 
of service provision in the emergency system, as well as 
cases of outright corruption110. Despite the introduction of 
compulsory distribution on a regional basis, the reception 
regime overall in Italy continued to suffer from insufficient 
space to accommodate new arrivals, which was further 
aggravated by lengthy bureaucratic timescales meaning 
months could pass before an appointment with an 
asylum commission would be confirmed. Delays in 
asylum processing undermined the willingness of some 
refugees and migrants to remain in Italy.
The managed arrival of refugees and migrants in Italy 
stood in stark contrast to the situation in Greece, where 
mass spontaneous arrivals on the Greek islands led to 
chaotic scenes. Shortly after taking power, the (former) 
Deputy Minister for Immigration Policy announced 
that migrants who were previously detained would be 
accommodated in ‘open hospitality centres’. These 
were to be created in empty public buildings, vacant 
apartments and former military camps. In March 2015 
an official document was leaked which stated that 
refugees and migrants entering the country irregularly 
would not be detained at the borders but would instead 
be provided with a document which instructed them 
to leave the country in thirty days. This was widely 
viewed as an unofficial ‘travel document’ enabling 
people to transit through Greece. However, as the 
numbers arriving on the islands increased throughout 
110   MSF (2016) Fuori Campo (Medecins Sans Frontieres), http://www.medicisenzafrontiere.it/notizie/news/fuori-campo-mappa-dell%E2%80%99accoglienza-che-esclude; 
LasciateCIEntrare (2016) Accoglienza: La Vera Emergenza (LasciateCIEntrare) http://www.lasciatecientrare.it/j25/italia/news-italia/193-scaricabile-il-rapporto-di-
lasciatecientrare-accogliere-la-vera-emergenza
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the summer, the lack of preparation and lack of facilities 
became starkly apparent. 
There was already evidence by January 2015 that the 
newly elected Greek government underestimated the 
clear signs of a significant increase in movement of people 
into Europe via Greece. During the summer of 2015 
and onwards, provision of reception facilities and other 
services by international organisations and NGOs in 
Greece sprung up largely in a void of State-led emergency 
provision, although the former were also slow to move 
to establish operations. By the autumn, refugees and 
migrants arriving on Greek beaches were increasingly 
met by a mixture of journalists, volunteers, international 
organisation and NGO representatives who provided 
them with food, water, information and sometimes 
transportation to the first reception camp. The relative lack 
of involvement of the Greek government (national and on 
the islands) stemmed from the political instability which 
had been generated by the austerity crisis and challenging 
negotiations with the EU over ‘bail-out’. Arguably, they also 
reflected the flawed assumption that if they ‘did nothing’ 
this would deter people from coming to Greece, or from 
staying if they did. 
Implications
The EU has focused almost exclusively on policies 
designed to contain refugees and migrants in Turkey 
and Libya, thereby stemming the flow into other parts of 
Europe. There has been a failure at the national and EU 
levels to address the reception and protection needs of 
those arriving from situations of conflict, persecution and 
human rights abuse. The Greek government’s approach 
was undermined by political difficulties, a lack of effective 
planning and economic crisis. There has also been a 
failure at the national and EU levels to address the longer 
term integration needs of refugees and migrants arriving 
in Europe. 
5.  MOVING BEYOND THE POLITICS OF 
CONTAINMENT 
Findings
Although there have been some efforts to address the 
needs of refugees and migrants arriving in Europe, 
for example through faltering attempts to establish 
a relocation programme, the focus of many EU 
governments is very firmly focused on preventing or 
discouraging people from attempting to reach EU 
territory in the first place, tackling smuggling networks, 
and rapidly deporting individuals who do not have a 
right to remain111. The extent to which the policy of 
containment is successful in reducing the ‘migration 
crisis’ will depend, in part, upon the evolving situation in 
Turkey following the attempted coup on 15th July 2016 
and whether the underlying factors driving migration 
across the Mediterranean (conflict, persecution, human 
rights abuse) are addressed. But it will also depend on 
the extent to which the EU’s efforts to ‘externalise’ its 
borders are successful. 
The EU’s interest in transferring responsibility for 
refugees and migrants to other regions is long-standing. 
For example, in 2003, the UK proposed the creation 
of processing centres outside the EU where asylum 
seekers would have to stay for the duration of their 
application process, and to which they would be 
111   HRW (2016) fn.106
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returned if they travelled to the EU. That and other ideas 
were never implemented, but the EU and its member 
states have pursued aspects of such ‘externalization’ 
strategies via bilateral and EU-wide readmission 
agreements with countries of transit and origin, under 
which those countries have agreed to accept the return 
of their nationals and in some cases third-country 
nationals who transited through their territory.
During the course of 2015 the EU has intensified 
pressure on other countries to stem the flow and 
assume responsibility for refugee and migrants from 
neighbouring countries so they do not travel onward 
to the EU. As part of this effort, the EU has pledged 
to increase humanitarian and other assistance to help 
improve the well-being of asylum seekers and refugees 
in those countries. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated 
by the EU-Turkey agreement but goes much further. 
Both the Rabat Process112, which began in 2006, and 
the Khartoum Process113, launched in 2014 are fora 
for European dialogue and cooperation with African 
countries which have increasingly linked the issue of 
development with the migration concerns of EU Member 
States. In both processes, the EU has placed an 
emphasis on border management, prevention of irregular 
migration, and improving regional protection. 
Implications
Firstly, there is a real risk that efforts to stem the flow 
of migration to the EU will fail to address the conflict, 
violence and human rights abuses that drive both 
primary and secondary migration into Europe. In fact EU 
policies may serve to exacerbate the situation further 
still. The EU should design, implement, and monitor 
migration cooperation with third countries to ensure the 
arrangements do not effectively trap people in abusive 
situations, prevent them from accessing fair asylum 
procedures, or lead to refoulement to places where they 
would be at risk of violence and persecution. It should 
also avoid cooperation with countries which are currently 
seeing significant outflows of displaced persons given 
the significant risk that such countries would manipulate 
the resulting processes to block its own nationals who 
fear persecution from seeking asylum in other countries. 
There is a chance, for example, that in the Khartoum 
Process the EU will channel significant funds through 
abusive governments in ways that end up harming 
people trying to flee persecution114. 
 
Secondly, policy makers need to engage with the 
issue of development as an important policy objective 
in its own right rather than primarily as a mechanism 
for preventing migration to Europe. The current focus 
in relation to the Central Mediterranean route is on 
achieving immigration control by proxy with African states 
(as seen, for example, in the conclusions of the Valletta 
summit115 and in the EU’s communication on establishing 
a new Partnership Framework with third countries under 
the European Agenda on Migration, more commonly 
known as the migration compact116). These policies 
underestimate the significance of intra-African mobility, 
assuming to a large extent that migration in Africa is 
112   See https://www.iom.int/euro-african-dialogue-migration-and-development-rabat-process 
113   See http://www.iom.int/eu-horn-africa-migration-route-initiative-khartoum-process 
114   HRW (2016) fn.106
115   See http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/newsroom/all-news/2015-valletta-summit-migration 
116   See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160607/communication_
external_aspects_eam_towards_new_migration_ompact_en.pdf
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unidirectional, and the final destination is always the EU. 
This false premise may ultimately lead to border closures 
within Africa which would achieve the opposite result. 
This is because closed borders are known to lead to 
greater permanence in migration, as the possibility of 
‘circular migration’ which enables people to move back 
and forth and retain strong links with their families, is 
removed. Many of our respondents had spent months 
in Libya and had first moved there with the intention to 
work and earn money, supporting their families through 
remittances as well as themselves. Such migration was 
intended to be temporary and was intended to result in 
a further journey to Italy. In this context, more inclusive 
labour markets and continued – or even increased – 
ease of movement within African regions, may do more 
to stem the flow of people towards Europe than the 
proxy border policing. 
Finally, Europe cannot be effective in lobbying for more 
appropriate policies towards refugees and migrants 
in the countries to which people initially move if it is 
not willing to demonstrate its own commitments to 
international legal standards of protection117. Recent 
research by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 
has found that the politics of containment – reflected 
in interdiction, interception and off-shore processing – 
do not impact only on refugees and migrants seeking 
protection in Europe. As noted in the introduction to this 
report, low- and middle-income countries are host to 
86% of the world’s refugee population. Although there 
are clearly also domestic factors at play, ODI has traced 
what they describe as a ‘ripple effect’, with developed 
countries influencing each other’s policies and 
consciously cultivating or indirectly fostering negative 
developments in lower income countries. Examples can 
be found in Indonesia, Kenya, Jordan and now Pakistan, 
which has started to repatriate Afghan refugees in huge 
numbers118. This will most likely serve only to stabilise 
already fragile political and economic situations, most 
likely leading to further outward migration, some of 
which will almost inevitably reach the shores of Europe. 
Seen within this wider international context, the 
European policy response to its so-called ‘migration 
crisis’ not only undermines access to protection for 
those arriving at Europe’s shores but threatens the 
principle of international protection at a global level.
117   Hargrave, K. and Pantuliano, S. with Idris, H. (2016) Closing Borders – The Ripple Effects of Australian and European Refugee Policy: Case Studies from Indonesia, 
Kenya and Jordan  https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10862.pdf 
118   https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/30/afghanistan-refugee-crisis-europe-pakistan 
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The MEDMIG project aims to better understand the 
processes which influence, inform and shape migration 
by speaking directly with those who crossed the 
Mediterranean in 2015 and with the numerous State and 
non-State actors who created opportunities and constraints 
along the way. To do this, a team of researchers was 
based in the four countries that are the focus of the study 
(Greece, Italy, Turkey and Malta) from September 2015 
to January 2016, undertaking interviews with refugees 
and migrants as well as stakeholders and observing 
events of the so-called ‘migration crisis’ as they unfolded. 
During this time we carried out semi-structured 
interviews with a total of 500 refugees and migrants, 
440 of whom had crossed the Mediterranean by 
boat in 2015 to Greece (215 interviews), Italy (205 
interviews) and Malta (20 interviews) together with a 
further 60 respondents who had moved to Turkey and 
were considering making the onward journey to Europe. 
These countries reflected the key locations of the crisis. 
In each location we gained access to people inside and 
out of formal refugee reception structures and adopted a 
purposive sampling strategy which enabled us to ensure 
that the backgrounds and demographic characteristics of 
respondents were broadly reflective of wider trends  
(See Annex 2 for details).
We also interviewed more than 100 stakeholders, 
including politicians, policy makers, naval officers and 
coastguards, representatives of international, non-
governmental and civil society actors, migrant and 
refugee associations and volunteers. These voices reflect 
the broad range of organisations that responded to 
the ‘crisis’ in politics and practice, enabling us to gain 
close insights into the varied ways that the situation was 
perceived, understood and experienced in each location. 
Our approach to the fieldwork had to be agile in order to 
adapt to different social and political contexts as well us 
enabling us to interview people who had recently arrived 
as well as those who were looking to transit onwards. In 
Greece, we found a chaotic context of arrival, reception 
and transit which refugees and migrants often sought to 
quickly move on from. To adapt to this situation, interviews 
were carried out at the port of Mytilene on the island 
of Lesbos, which was an important place of arrival and 
transit to the Greek mainland, and at three locations in the 
city of Athens: Victoria Square in Athens where coaches 
depart to the Greek border with FYROM; another square 
where people were informally residing and in Eleonas 
camp, one of the first formal reception facilities in Athens. 
In Italy, a complex reception system dispersing newly-
arrived refugees and migrants to reception centres 
around the country existed alongside processes of 
informal reception and transit migration. This meant 
that many refugees and migrants quickly moved away 
from disembarkation locations or formal facilities and 
on to other locations. To capture this complex range of 
contexts we carried out interviews in various locations in 
Eastern Sicily, Apulia and Piedmont, as well as in transit 
and reception centres in the cities of Rome and Bologna. 
In Malta our interviews were undertaken outside formal 
reception facilities. The interviews in Turkey took place 
in Istanbul and Izmir among those living in the city. 
The research generated a large dataset within a very short 
period of time which was coded and analysed using NVivo 
to identify quantitative as well as qualitative patterns. In 
addition to undertaking detailed qualitative analysis, this has 
enabled us to draw out broader patterns and trends within 
and across countries, different groups of refugees and 
migrants and according to demographic and other variables.
Annexes
Annex 1: Our methodology
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Our dataset consists of interviews with 500 refugees and migrants and 111 stakeholders across the 
four case study countries. This annex provides an overview of the key characteristics of the data.
Country case studies
As noted in Annex 1, our refugee and migrant interview dataset broadly mirrors the composition of the 
refugee and migrant population arriving in our case study countries. The nationalities of our interviewees and 
the distribution of age and gender are shown on pages 76 -79 for each of these case study countries. 
Annex 2: Our dataset
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119  Where figures do not add up to the correct total, it is due to a shortage of appropriate data for some interviewees.
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Route case studies
Our dataset can be divided broadly into three route-specific categories: people who cross the Eastern 
Mediterranean sea crossing from Turkey to Greece, people who crossed the Central Mediterranean from 
North Africa to Italy or Malta, and people who had moved to Turkey and not yet crossed the Mediterranean to 
Europe. Across these four countries we interviewed 238 people who had crossed the Eastern route of the 
Mediterranean, from Turkey to Greece, and 202 who had crossed the Central route from North Africa to Europe. 
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Stakeholders
We also interviewed 111 stakeholders, from politicians to policy makers, naval officers and coastguards, 
researchers, experts, representatives of international organisations and NGOs, members of migrant 
and refugee associations and volunteers. These interviewees were selected to provide expert 
views, up-to-date insights into evolving migration flows and individual experiences of the situation in 
each location. The sector of our interviewees in each country is shown in the table below.
 Stakeholder type Italy Greece Malta Turkey Total
 Civil Society 9 7 1 5 22
 Expert 7 1 3 1 12
 International organisation 3 3 0 0 6
 NGO 18 15 5 5 43
 Political institution 4 19 3 2 28
   41 45 12 13 111
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